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Diversity May Be Justified 
Anita Bernstein* 
What about diversity as a rationale for affirmative action is compelling enough to justify 
the hurts it inflicts on individuals? Judges, legislators, public opinion, and implementers 
of diversity programs in education and the workforce have defended their initiatives 
either with vague, anodyne, ill-founded paeans or, more often, with silence about what the 
rationale achieves. They have offered no justification of diversity.  
 
From the premise that any state action that generates (or even risks) harm must be 
supported with reason, this Article undertakes the task of justification. What makes 
diversity unique among the rationales for affirmative action, this Article argues, is its 
power simultaneously to achieve two social goods—the repair of subordination and the 
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Introduction 
Institutions struggle to defend their policies of discrimination aimed 
at liberal ends. When a complainant objects in court to such an initiative, 
judges are likely to condemn it as a violation of constitutional or 
statutory rights. Proffered rationales for progressive-minded 
discrimination—known for decades as affirmative action1—typically fail. 
Maintaining that only “a compelling governmental interest”2 will 
permit state action that takes codified characteristics of an individual into 
 
 1. The first use of this phrase in American federal law appears in an executive order signed by 
President John F. Kennedy soon after he took office. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 
1961) (directing federal contractors to take affirmative action toward equal employment opportunities). 
Used to describe overt efforts for redress, however, “affirmative action” appeared in print in 1866; it has 
been applied to civil rights since World War II. See Kevin L. Yuill, Richard Nixon and the Rise of 
Affirmative Action: The Pursuit of Racial Equality in an Era of Limits 33–34 (2006). 
 2. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). 
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account, and giving private sector employers little room to maneuver 
around antidiscrimination laws,3 the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a 
range of reasonable-sounding motivations for affirmative action—
including the repair of statistically manifested inequality,4 the need for 
schoolchildren to have role model teachers,5 and plausible worries about 
a disparate-impact discrimination claim in the future6—do not justify this 
measure. A state actor may still implement a group-based remedy for 
past wrongs,7 but courts, led here by the Supreme Court, seldom agree 
that any historical violation of law justifies sorting persons based on their 
membership in a class.8 
Thus affirmative action, barely legal these days, stays alive in 
American law with the help of one last rationale.9 The rationale left 
standing is diversity, understood descriptively as “those differences in 
values, attributes, or activities among individuals or groups that a 
particular society deems salient to the social status or behavior of those 
individuals or groups.”10 Understood normatively as a rationale for 
action, it casts institutional practices that would otherwise violate the 
civil or constitutional rights of individuals in a positive light. Diversity 
makes discriminatory behaviors lawful. 
Diversity can go only so far in aid of affirmative action. At least 
three limitations reduce its reach. First, the Supreme Court has deemed 
 
 3. A generation ago the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act permits employers to 
impose plans that discriminate in favor of protected groups. Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara 
Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987) (upholding a program that favored women); United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (upholding a program that favored racial minorities). On the 
dwindling strength of these precedents, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, 
Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 3–4 (2005). 
 4. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989). 
 5. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). 
 6. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009). 
 7. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Argot of Equality: On the Importance of Disentangling 
“Diversity” and “Remediation” as Justifications for Race-Conscious Government Action, 87 Wash. U. 
L. Rev. 907, 917 (2010). 
 8. See Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1622, 1625–26 (2003) (attributing 
this narrow range of acceptability to the consensus-minded jurisprudence of Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor). 
 9. On its fragility, see Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 Yale L. 
& Pol’y Rev. 1, 34 (2002) (calling diversity a “rhetorical Hail Mary pass, an argument made in 
desperation when all other arguments for preferences have failed”); Adam Liptak, College Diversity 
Nears Its Last Stand, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2011, at SR4 (predicting rejection by the Supreme Court in 
the 2012 Term); Adam Liptak, Justices Take up Race as a Factor in College Entry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 
2012, at A1 (reporting a certiorari decision that “has the potential to eliminate diversity as a rationale 
sufficient to justify any use of race in admissions decisions”). 
 10. Peter H. Schuck, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance 7 (2003). 
For other definitions, see Katharine Esty et al., Workplace Diversity: A Manager’s Guide to 
Solving Problems and Turning Diversity into a Competitive Advantage 1 (1995); Maureen J. 
Giovannini, What Gets Measured Gets Done: Achieving Results Through Diversity and Inclusion, 27 J. 
Quality & Participation 21, 22 (2004) (defining diversity as “any dimension that can be used to 
differentiate groups and people from one another”). 
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particular programs defended in the name of affirmative action 
unconstitutional, foreclosing this rationale from supporting replications.11 
Second, on occasion a better justification for affirmative action than 
diversity will be available to state-actor defendants accused of 
discrimination in favor of subordinated groups.12 Third, even when it 
prevails, the diversity rationale seems to trouble lawyers and judges.13 For 
all its infirmities, however, diversity endures as the strongest rationale to 
support progressive-minded discrimination when these measures are 
challenged in court.14 
In hindsight, one could have predicted that this ideal would fare well 
in American doctrine and discourse.15 Using diversity as policy adverts to 
past invidious discrimination—a reality that participants in dialogues 
about social welfare wish to acknowledge—but also tactfully refrains 
from accusing anyone of doing wrong. The term invokes mending rather 
than penalty or detriment, and expansion rather than a painful zero-sum 
struggle over some scarce good. Diversity invites; it implies welcome.16 
Bounteous connotations evaporate on closer examination, however. 
Listeners might hear promises in it, but any promises in the term are 
projections. Diversity means what those who use it want it to mean.17 
The indeterminate legal content of diversity has generated an 
enormous yet incomplete literature. Writers—including those who like 
 
 11. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 724–25 
(2007) (rejecting the diversity rationale as used in grade-school education); Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244, 269 (2003) (invalidating a diversity plan that assigned state-university applicants points 
for particular characteristics). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166–67 (1987) (approving an affirmative 
action plan by the Alabama Department of Public Safety to remedy past discrimination); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 60–61. 
 13. See Smith v. Univ. Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (condoning a diversity 
plan as “the narrowest footing upon which a race-conscious decision making process could stand”); 
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 941–42 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting a lack of consensus among the Justices 
about diversity as a compelling governmental interest). 
 14. Krotoszynski, supra note 7. 
 15. On support in doctrine, see infra Part I.A.; on support in discourse, see Walter Benn 
Michaels, The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality 
12 (2006) (“[D]iversity has become virtually a sacred concept in American life today. No one’s really 
against it; people tend instead to differ only in their degrees of enthusiasm for it and their ingenuity in 
pursuing it.”); Trina Jones, The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 171, 
172–75 (2005) (reviewing poll data and commentary published in the popular press). 
 16. Compare Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really 
Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1222, 1223–24 (1991) (criticizing the diversity rationale for 
its inattention to historical wrongs), and Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique 
of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 928, 953 (2001), with Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 98 (1986) 
(arguing that “a focus on the sins of discrimination” dooms affirmative action measures to partial 
success). 
 17. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1839, 1849 (1996) (“Everybody 
talks about diversity, but no one knows what it means.”). 
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affirmative action and those who don’t—have called it shallow, hollow, 
inane.18 This charge provokes a battle-weary response from the left: 
Because diversity is now the strongest rationale to support governmental 
recognition of individuals’ membership in subordinated groups, activists 
should work with what they have rather than waste time mourning the 
defeat of more pointed political rhetoric.19 The right also divides on 
diversity. Some conservative observers attack it as pernicious;20 others 
extol it;21 still others propose that diversity be applied to new 
interventions.22 To date, no robust account of the diversity rationale—a 
defense of it that persons disadvantaged by its use can see the reasoning 
behind23—has been published. In this Article, I set out to fill the void. 
 
 18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 354–55 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Delgado, supra 
note 16. 
 19. Sumi K. Cho, Multiple Consciousness and the Diversity Dilemma, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1035, 
1052–53 (1997); Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 Va. L. Rev. 697, 733–34 (1999) 
(book review). 
 20. See, e.g., Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society 335 
(1995) (“‘[M]anaging [workplace] diversity’ is an ideological movement masquerading as a booster of 
corporate performance.”); Peter W. Wood, Diversity: The Invention of a Concept 145 (2003) 
(“[D]iversity [as practiced in higher education] . . . is intellectually threadbare and ethically 
contemptible.”); Roger Clegg, Why I’m Sick of the Praise for Diversity on Campuses, Chron. Higher 
Educ., Jul. 14, 2000, at B8 (attacking diversity as contrary to merit). 
 21. Responding to the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision on affirmative action at the University of 
Michigan, see infra Part I.B., President George W. Bush declared, “I strongly support diversity of all 
kinds, including racial diversity in higher education.” Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Affirmative Action: 
Constitutional Questions; President Faults Race Preferences as Admission Tool, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 
2003, at A1 [hereinafter Bush Statement]; see also infra note 22 and accompanying text (implicitly 
endorsing diversity). 
 22. Nominees for new diversity categories include religion, see Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different 
Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and Affirmative Action’s Destiny, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 811, 862 (1998); 
viewpoints, see James Lindgren, Conceptualizing Diversity in Empirical Terms, 23 Yale L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 5, 10 (2005); and conservatives in the academy, see Gary McCaleb, For the Human Rights 
Campaign, Diversity Is Not Enough (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/11/ 
for_the_human_rights_campaign_diversity_is_not_enough.html. 
 23. See Adversity.Net, http://www.adversity.net (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (website established 
“for victims of reverse discrimination”). Assessments of affirmative action that focus on persons who 
feel harmed by its interventions include Robert K. Fullinwider, The Reverse Discrimination 
Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis (1980) (reaching no conclusion on the question of 
justification); Ken Feagins, Affirmative Action or the Same Sin?, 67 Denv. U. L. Rev. 421, 422 (1990) 
(“As a result of affirmative action programs, marginally qualified white males rapidly are replacing 
black females as the group most frequently discriminated against in American society.”); Lisa Newton, 
Reverse Discrimination as Unjustified, 83 Ethics 308, 312 (1973) (arguing that benign discrimination is 
no better than the invidious discrimination that preceded it). For more recent work in this vein, see 
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and 
Reparations, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 683, 690 n.20 (2004) (gathering sources). 
  Proponents of diversity occasionally state or imply that diversity does no harm. See, e.g., 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (concluding that a challenged affirmative action program 
in a state university “does not unduly harm nonminority applicants”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (declaring that a hypothetical individual whose competitor enjoyed “a 
‘plus’ on the basis of ethnic background” has “no basis to complain of unequal treatment” even if he 
has lost “the last available seat”); Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action FAQs, Univ. of 
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Claiming that diversity may be justified calls for not only an 
investigation of how the diversity rationale functions in contemporary 
American law, but also of the verb “to justify” itself. Justification, the 
noun form, holds particular sway in criminal and tort law. When 
functioning as a defense, it tells a victim that the detriment she suffered 
will not be condemned by the courts because inflicting that harm was the 
correct course for the defendant.24 Justifying diversity, consistent with 
justification elsewhere in the law, ought also to address harmed 
individuals.25 
Human beings with names and life plans—Allan Bakke,26 Barbara 
Grutter,27 Abigail Fisher,28 Jennifer Gratz,29 Frank Ricci,30 and Sharon 
Taxman,31 among others—gained attention from the Supreme Court 
when they objected to governmental actions that focused detrimentally 
on a characteristic of theirs recognized by civil rights law. They won 
certiorari, a scarce prize.32 Diversity rationales helped the institutional 
opponents they accused, just as self-defense helps human defendants 
accused of homicide and other crimes. 
 
Iowa, Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, http://www.uiowa.edu/~eod/searches/manual/ 
FAQ/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“Isn’t affirmative action a form of reverse discrimination? 
No. . . . Learning to value the contributions of women and minorities requires a change in how we 
think.”); Equal Employment Opportunity Diversity Frequently Asked Questions, National Archives, 
http://www.archives.gov/eeo/policy/diversity-faq.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“Is there a cost benefit 
to Diversity? We can obtain a cost benefit by measuring such things as improved employee morale, 
lower turnover rates, higher productivity, fewer hiring costs, and decrease in absenteeism.”). In this 
Article, I stipulate that the diversity rationale for affirmative action can cause individuals to suffer 
detriment. See infra notes 25–32 and accompanying text. 
 24. “A defendant who raises a justification defense in a criminal prosecution says, in essence, ‘I 
did nothing wrong for which I should be punished.’” Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A 
Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1155, 1161 (1987). The exemplar of 
a justification in criminal law is self-defense. Id. at 1161–63 n.22. 
 25. By “harmed individuals” I mean persons who complain in court about a specific instance of 
detriment linked to an affirmative action program, not members of dominant groups who feel 
burdened by affirmative action in the larger society. The latter cohort may have suffered no harm. See 
generally Fred L. Pincus, Reverse Discrimination: Dismantling the Myth (2003) (arguing that 
resentment of affirmative action among white men stems from their feeling powerlessness about 
income and employment patterns rather than prejudice against them for being male and white). 
 26. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
 27. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306. 
 28. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (Feb. 21, 
2012) (No. 11-345). 
 29. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 30. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 577, 563 (2009). 
 31. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521 
U.S. 1117 (1997). 
 32. Christine M. Macey, Referral Is Not Required: How Inexperienced Supreme Court Advocates 
Can Fulfill Their Ethical Obligations, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 979, 983 n.33 (2009) (noting that in a 
typical Supreme Court term, the odds of gaining certiorari after filing a petition are about one in a 
hundred). 
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As used in court to defend policies that discriminate, the diversity 
rationale seems to regard injury to plaintiffs as collateral damage and not 
very interesting or important.33 But whenever an action, especially an 
action taken as policy by the state, has imposed harm on persons who 
have done nothing wrong—turned them away from a job, perhaps, or 
denied them admission to a selective school—courts that leave this harm 
unrectified ought to say why. “We had to hurt you for the sake of 
diversity” is unsatisfactory because it does not tell injured persons 
enough. If diversity may be justified, then litigants who experienced 
detriment and then lost in court can receive what the law has owed them 
all along: a principled reckoning. 
Until this explanation emerges, rationales for diversity will resemble 
excuses more than justifications.34 Diversity differs from criminal-defense 
excuses in one central respect: Criminal-defense excuses, which dispute 
the blameworthiness of the defendant, always admit that the conduct had 
bad effects. Proponents of diversity do not describe what they pursue as 
harm. Diversity, sings the chorus, is good. Consistent with the criminal-
defense understanding of excuses as involuntary,35 however, defenses of 
diversity sidestep basic questions of accountability and agency. 
A judge reading a complaint about an affirmative action scheme 
might wonder which individuals installed the diversity goal in question, 
when the diversity-motivated policy became potent enough in practice to 
vex persons in the circumstances of the petitioner and, should diversity 
ever prove unproductive for the defendant in the future, who holds the 
key to turn this engine off. The diversity rationale in its current form 
takes no interest in the origins of conscious designs by individuals. Like 
excuse, it emerges in court as an ambient condition rather than a choice 
that urged decisionmakers to act in a particular way because acting that 
way was the correct thing for them to do. 
The most striking similarity between criminal-defense excuses and 
diversity is what they lack: Both reach the judiciary with no claim that 
the challenged behavior honored a moral, legal, or political imperative. A 
criminal defendant who says that a condition like intoxication or duress 
should excuse conduct on her part—conduct that both fulfilled the 
elements of a crime and injured someone—does not claim that her 
 
 33. See infra Part II.B. 
 34. The excused defendant stands in contrast to the justified defendant, who “emerges from the 
resolution of his criminal prosecution with his reputation and character intact.” Elaine M. Chiu, 
Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1317, 1331 (2006). A person who acted with 
justification did nothing wrong. An excuse, by contrast, acknowledges wrongness: Although it denies 
the culpability of an actor, it does not extol his behavior. Excuses include duress, insanity, intoxication, 
somnambulism, and mistake as to justification. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A 
Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 242–43 (1982). Tort law shares this hierarchy: It 
recognizes justifications but not excuses as defenses. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 157 (2000). 
 35. Robinson, supra note 34, at 242. 
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duress or intoxication deserves approval. The diversity rationale is 
almost as timorous. Litigants defend their pursuit as vaguely desirable 
rather than necessary. 
This Article argues that action taken in the name of diversity should 
be examined with reference to ideals. Which circumstances justify 
beneficent classifications of persons based on conditions they did not 
choose, like their race or sex? What justifies imposing detriments on 
members of correlative groups such as persons classed as white?36 My 
inquiry acknowledges that in settings where courts recognize diversity as a 
rationale for affirmative action—mainly education and the workplace—
thin or vague rationales for this intervention can be expedient.37 Part I of 
this Article explores the development of the diversity rationale as it 
emerged from the Supreme Court. Working from this foundation, the 
Article next explores the advantages of going light on principle or 
endorsing diversity as a vague, nonspecific good. When it is not justified—
the condition it is in now—diversity suits the needs of numerous 
constituencies and decisionmakers. Part II, subtitled “The Uses of 
Blandness,” surveys diversity as an anodyne instrument. 
Courts and policymakers need a thick case for diversity too. Once 
diversity is justified—not excused or condoned as it is at present—then 
distributions made in its name become not only lawful but also 
compelling. Individuals might have an enforceable entitlement to 
particular diversity-driven policies from governments;38 they might have 
standing to demand these measures in court. Interventions done in the 
name of diversity that implementers cannot justify, by contrast, misuse 
the rationale and constitute wrongful discrimination. To the extent that 
implementing diversity remains optional rather than a legal imperative, 
 
 36. One might query whether “groups” include cohorts of persons identified by their class and 
levels of wealth. If not, why not? See generally Michaels, supra note 15 (arguing that the diversity 
rationale for affirmative action functions to bolster inequality and flatter the privileged). I take up—
but certainly do not resolve—this challenge below. See infra Part III. 
 37. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 912–13 (recognizing the need for implementers to minimize 
backlash). 
 38. Although this Article pays occasional heed to diversity as a Title VII rationale used by private 
employers, its assessment of the diversity rationale focuses on state action. When a private-sector 
employer imposes detriments in the name of diversity without having once practiced invidious 
discrimination in current need of rectification, the rationale becomes harder to justify. See generally 
Jared M. Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After Grutter: 
The Case for Containment, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1091, 1145–46 (2006) (“A few sound judicially 
crafted exceptions to the equal protection rule for race and more for protected nonrace 
characteristics . . . are not per se inconsistent with the text of the Equal Protection Clause. Title VII 
exceptions in the statutory text, however, are nonexistent for racial classifications . . . .”). But see 
Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 628 (1987) (insisting that “taking race 
into account” is consistent with Title VII, even if an employer has not undertaken to repair its own 
discrimination). My thesis does support amending, or even repealing, civil rights statutes that ban 
every kind of unequal treatment based on a person’s membership in a codified list of groups. See 
generally infra Part V.C (discussing implications for government decisionmakers). 
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decisionmakers ought to reflect on robust versions of this choice along 
with the anodyne construct that now prevails. 
Robust versions of the choice—that is, diversity justified—can 
emerge at two levels. Part III examines the first, and more familiar, level. 
It equates antisubordination with corrective and distributive justice. 
Here diversity is a manifestation as well as an end in itself; it is what 
results from interventions that strive to repair group-based historical 
injustice. Part IV, recognizing that in contemporary American courts 
antisubordination is a nonstarter, explores how diversity resembles other 
ideals and precepts that pervade contemporary law and government. The 
analogues gathered in this Part can justify diversity even for those who 
lack or renounce any commitment to antisubordination. 
Arrayed to enlarge support for the diversity rationale, these ideals 
widen the base on which a diversity rationale rests. They are means as 
well as ends. Part V concludes the Article by reviewing the diversity 
rationale with reference to choices for institutions and governments. 
Affirmative action in this last Part is literally action when diversity 
functions to put agendas into effect. Once it is understood as principled, 
diversity can guide—rather than merely rationalize—the conduct of state 
actors who seek fidelity to both justice and equal protection of the laws. 
I.  Diversity Enters Doctrine 
A. Five Votes in REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. BAKKE 
Neither party has prevailed, announced the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the great affirmation action dispute of its 1977 Term.39 All nine Justices 
voted. Harry Blackmun, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and 
Byron White sided with the Regents of the University of California, 
which had set aside for minority applicants sixteen places in a hundred-
student medical school class at the Davis campus. The four signed a joint 
opinion; three of them wrote separately as well. Warren Burger, Potter 
Stewart, William Rehnquist, and John Paul Stevens sided with the 
plaintiff-respondent, a white man who had been refused admission to the 
medical school class. Omitting reference to the Constitution, this group 
relied on Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40 
The ninth Justice, Lewis Powell, rejected three rationales proffered 
by the University of California in defense of its affirmative action plan—
rectifying the disproportionately low number of minority medical 
students, countering the effects of societal discrimination, and trying to 
provide underserved communities with physicians41—before finding one 
 
 39. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 40. Id. at 417–18 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 41. Michele S. Moses & Mitchell J. Chang, Toward a Deeper Understanding of the Diversity 
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that he could endorse: Universities, Powell concluded, have a compelling 
interest in what he called “beneficial educational pluralism.”42 Two 
sentences that Powell composed were acceptable to Blackmun, Brennan, 
Marshall, and White. They formed Part V-C of his opinion, the only 
passage in Bakke to win a majority of votes: 
In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, 
however, the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a 
substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly 
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of 
race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California 
court’s judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the 
race of any applicant must be reversed.43 
How could any governmental “consideration of race and ethnic 
origin” of a person be “properly devised”? Justice Powell expounded on 
this question, speaking only for himself. Powell contended that variety in 
a student population generates “speculation, experiment and creation,”44 
an atmosphere that enhances learning. Multiple “experiences, outlooks, 
and ideas”45 in a class of admitted students is an acceptable agenda for a 
state-university admissions policy. Because dialogue produced by a 
diverse student body relates closely to what institutions teach even when 
it takes place outside the classroom, Powell continued, choosing diversity 
in admissions is also a matter of academic freedom, “a special concern of 
the First Amendment.”46 Powell objected to the Davis policy for its 
message to Allan Bakke that because of his racial classification he had 
access to one of only eighty-four places, while his “Negro, Asian, or 
Chicano” rivals had an “opportunity to compete for every seat in the 
class,”47 the full hundred. Too rigid. Yet Powell approved using group 
memberships, including race and ethnic origin, to affect distributions 
from the State of California. 
What Powell meant by diversity has been debated for decades. 
Three value judgments pertinent to the law of equal protection underlie 
his conclusion. First, heterogeneity is desirable. Second, managers of 
institutions must hold prerogatives. Third, quotas are at best troubling, if 
not flat-out unconstitutional.48 
 
Rationale, 35 Educ. Researcher 6, 7 (2006). 
 42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. 
 43. Id. at 320. 
 44. Id. at 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring)). 
 45. Id. at 314. 
 46. Id. at 312. 
 47. Id. at 319–20. 
 48. Michael Selmi draws similar conclusions, omitting the one about managerial prerogative: 
[I]f one wants to know what the law on affirmative action was then or is now, the best place 
to look would be Justice Powell’s opinion, where one would learn that race can be used as 
one factor among many; quotas are constitutionally impermissible while goals are 
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These three positions—each of them pointedly silent about 
segregation and subordination—became the Bakke that endured, making 
the Powell opinion a landmark.49 Pre-Bakke case law on integration, 
stretching back even before Brown v. Board of Education,50 had affirmed 
the value of what Powell would later call “a diverse student body,”51 but 
always with reference to repair. Older cases construing the Equal 
Protection Clause to support desegregation measures had made 
reference to unlawful adversity that judges traced to enslavement.52 
The University of California, however, had embraced race-based 
affirmative action not to rectify any admitted-to discrimination in its past, 
but to enhance its present and future. A policy measure that imposes 
detriment and benefit on individuals based on a protected characteristic, 
installed by an entity without simultaneously asserting that it has any 
historical wrong to repair, characterizes affirmative action as 
contemporary judges approve it. Post-Bakke case law illustrates the 
phenomenon. 
B. Post-BAKKE Diversity 
After enlisting four colleagues to sign onto his two careful 
sentences, Justice Powell went on to construe his innovation narrowly. 
One year after Bakke, he disagreed with the Court’s approval of a 
comprehensive desegregation plan. In his view, the scheme usurped 
prerogatives that belonged to parents and local school authorities:53 “The 
primary and continuing responsibility for public education, including the 
bringing about and maintaining of desired diversity, must be left with 
school officials and public authorities.”54 When a majority of his 
colleagues approved minority set-aside legislation in 1980, Powell wrote 
 
acceptable; preference programs cannot be used to remedy societal discrimination; no racial 
classification may be treated as benign; and the role model theory will not justify a program, 
even though a diverse student body may serve as a compelling justification. 
Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 Geo. L.J. 981, 999 (1999) 
(citations omitted). 
 49. Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An 
Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 
437, 444 (2011) (“[B]efore Bakke, the notion that diversity could be a compelling governmental 
interest was never suggested.”). 
 50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 51. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306. Among the harbingers of diversity as a compelling interest was Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (observing that a desegregated classroom 
can “prepare students to live in a pluralistic society”). 
 52. Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 577, 593 (2009) (“In 
Sweatt [v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)] and McLaurin [v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)], . . . we see the Court’s allusion to the democratic and social benefits 
flowing from a racially diverse student body.”). 
 53. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Pinnick, 443 U.S. 449, 479 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 489. 
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separately to defend this measure as very different from the Bakke 
intervention that he had voted against: Fullilove v. Klutznick, he said, 
rested on detailed findings by Congress that established the necessity of 
favoring minority contractors.55 Powell never made diversity central to 
another decision before retiring in 1987, nine years after his remarkable 
articulation of a rationale. 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor took up the diversity baton. In 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,56 which found the need to furnish 
role models for minority children insufficient to support favoring 
minorities in layoffs, O’Connor suggested that the diversity rationale 
could have made a difference: Role models and diversity are very 
different goals, she wrote in a footnote to her concurrence, and the 
school board had unfortunately omitted diversity in its lower-court 
arguments.57 
In Grutter v. Bollinger, when the Court held for the first time that 
diversity is a compelling interest that justifies race-conscious measures by 
a state actor, Justice O’Connor wrote the 5–4 majority opinion.58 Grutter 
permitted the University of Michigan Law School to consider race in 
admissions. Expanding Justice Powell’s appreciation for discursive 
breadth within education, the Grutter majority extolled diversity as 
central to preparing students for life in society and even to “the 
legitimacy of American government.”59 Justice O’Connor cited an amicus 
brief, signed by military leaders, to support her conclusion that diversity 
is a matter of national security.60 
Diversity in the Supreme Court has only held steady, rather than 
gained, after the leap forward of Grutter. The diversity rationale was not 
strong enough to save affirmative action plans challenged in 200761 and 
2009.62 Although both cases were losses for affirmative action, they 
honored the diversity rationale.63 And there are no rival rationales for 
 
 55. 448 U.S. 448, 516–17 (1980). 
 56. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 57. Id. at 289. 
 58. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
 59. See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic 
Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1767, 1770 (2004). 
 60. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331. 
 61. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 62. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 577, 563 (2009). 
 63. In Parents Involved, the Court noted that defendant school districts had failed to show that 
racial classifications were necessary to attain the diversity they sought. 551 U.S. at 724–25. Ricci, in 
which the word “diversity” does not appear, held that a city government could not throw out 
firefighter tests whose white takers had performed better out of fear of disparate-impact liability in 
future litigation brought by minority test-takers. 557 U.S. at 563. Ricci nevertheless left room for 
positive discrimination in the future: A state actor may practice race-conscious affirmative action, 
wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy, when it has “a strong basis in evidence” to support its worry about 
liability. Id. 
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affirmative action: “Racial classification” and “racial balance,” for 
example, are terms of opprobrium to the Court.64 
Meanwhile, lower courts have approved and extended the diversity 
rationale for workplace affirmative action in the context of law 
enforcement. The Seventh Circuit agreed that Chicago, “a racially and 
ethnically divided major city,” needed diversity—more minorities at the 
sergeant level of its police force—to enhance community trust and 
cooperation with law enforcement.65 Ruling against an aggrieved white 
police officer who was not given a promotion to inspector, a federal trial 
court nevertheless commended diversity as a stated goal for the 
defendant city to pursue.66 
II.  An Anodyne Rationale, or, The Uses of Blandness 
Quoting a remark attributed to Randall Kennedy, James Lindgren 
once wrote that “[n]o one really believes in diversity.”67 Proponents who 
defend diversity have “asserted a rationale they didn’t believe,” Lindgren 
continued, “because, after Bakke, diversity was all that was left to 
support affirmative action.”68 In a much-cited article, Sanford Levinson 
has claimed that the Supreme Court uses diversity to play the game of 
Simon Says: When “Simon says, ‘Start talking about diversity—and 
downplay any talk about rectification of past social injustice,’ then the 
conversation proceeds exactly in that direction.”69 
If diversity doesn’t address past social injustice, what then does it 
address? If the term means nothing, why is it popular? Vagueness 
accompanying this word might be, as the tech phrase goes, not a bug but 
a feature. This Part contends that diversity as accepted by the Supreme 
Court covertly expands the prerogatives of individuals who manage large 
institutions. 
Other uses of the diversity rationale paste smiley faces on a 
complicated record. As Justice Thomas observed trenchantly in his 
Grutter dissent, enthusiasts do not have good evidence to support their 
assertion that instilling diversity causes positive social consequences.70 
Another criticism, attributed above to Levinson but articulated earlier by 
 
 64.  Nelson, supra note 52, at 593. 
 65. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (7th Cir. 2003). A pre-Grutter decision from 
the same court, authored by Judge Posner, had approved the favoring of an African-American 
applicant to the position of lieutenant in an Illinois “boot camp” correctional facility; the court 
concluded that the facility “would not succeed in its mission of pacification and reformation with as 
white a staff as it would have had if a black male had not been appointed to one of the lieutenant 
slots.” Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 66. See generally Dietz v. Baker, 523 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del. 2007). 
 67. Lindgren, supra note 22, at 5. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 573, 578 (2000). 
 70. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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other scholars, is that diversity rhetoric muffles well-founded complaints 
about subordination and puts bland good cheer in their place.71 In this 
vein, this Part discusses three such anodyne uses of diversity: managerial 
prerogative, happy empirical claims, and papering over subordination. 
These uses of diversity as a vague, nonspecific good certainly serve 
various agendas. They may even achieve good effects. But they do not 
justify the diversity rationale. 
A. Diversity as a Prerogative for Managers 
Both proponents of diversity and scholars of affirmative action 
doctrine have remarked on the enthusiasm for diversity held by 
American businesses. Prominent corporations have articulated their 
steadfast support of this value. They have filed amicus briefs laden with 
praise for diversity.72 In “A Statement of Principle,” the chief legal 
officers of five hundred publicly traded companies endorsed diversity in 
the sense considered here. Refuting any notion that diversity efforts 
belong to the left, big business has stood unwaveringly for this precept in 
the U.S. Supreme Court.73 
Employers do not limit their embrace of diversity to amicus briefs 
and pledges. One report, published in the New York Times as an 
advertising supplement, offered lively features from about two dozen 
large companies (including the Times itself) telling how they integrate 
diversity into their operations.74 Several use diversity as a yardstick when 
dealing with vendors and suppliers.75 
Businesses that celebrate diversity do not, however, explore 
whether these initiatives have led to quantifiable improvements in the 
short term or in their profits over time.76 They describe diversity more 
with adjectives than numbers.77 Although announcements of cost-cutting 
 
 71. See infra Part II.B. 
 72. Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Segregation, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 599, 632 
(2011); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: 
The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1548, 1576 (2004). 
 73. Garda, supra note 72 (reviewing amicus briefs filed in Grutter and Parents Involved). See 
generally Frank Dobbin, Inventing Equal Opportunity (2009) (arguing that workplace affirmative 
action originated in managers’ decisions rather than law-based imperatives).  
 74. See Jason Forsythe, Leading with Diversity, N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/marketing/ 
jobmarket/diversity (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 75. See Anjali Chavan, The “Charles Morgan Letter” and Beyond: The Impact of Diversity 
Initiatives on Big Law, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 521, 524–27 (2010) (citing statements issued by Wal-
Mart and General Electric). 
 76. Fay Hansen, Diversity’s Business Case Doesn’t Add up, Workforce, Apr. 2003, at 28. 
 77. See David G. Embrick, The Diversity Ideology in the Business World: A New Oppression for a 
New Age, 37 Critical Soc. 541, 541 (2011) (arguing, based on interviews with Fortune 1000 managers, 
that corporate leaders who endorse diversity as policy cannot “effectively elaborate on their company’s 
diversity policies or practices”). 
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measures emerge routinely from corporate public relations offices and 
investors associate cost-cutting moves (including layoffs) with positive 
prospects for the stock price, no publicly traded corporation appears to 
have ever revealed its decision to abandon a diversity initiative on the 
ground that it did not pay. Diversity programs in big business sometimes 
wane, but they appear internally unscrutinized as sources of gain or loss.78 
Writers who have noted diversity-enthusiasm within American business 
have also failed to say just why the cheering persists.79 
It might seem odd that a for-profit corporation would pour time and 
money into an initiative without concern for its bottom line. Once 
diversity is understood as a prerogative, however—an option that derives 
from and demonstrates power—the investment starts to make sense 
regardless of the results it achieves: “Organizations like having the 
flexibility of not being put in a box about whether this does or doesn’t 
work,” as a diversity consultant once put the point.80 Because private 
entities have more freedom than government actors to sort by group-
based characteristics, managers know that whatever position they 
espouse on diversity—for, against, a little, a lot—will likely remain 
optional. To the extent that employee morale and external perceptions 
affect corporate performance, an embrace of diversity will please several 
constituencies. It will also avoid the controversy that vexes affirmative 
action measures described in reparative terms. 
Hence my hypothesis: Other things being equal, diversity as policy 
gives more prerogatives to individuals who make personnel decisions. 
Diversity-as-prerogative appeals not only to private-sector business 
leaders, but also to managers serving as state actors—like Lee Bollinger, 
for example, who as president of the University of Michigan found his 
name after the v. in two Supreme Court decisions that examined the 
diversity rationale.81 Just as corporation managers do not tally up what 
exactly diversity does for a company’s market capitalization, human 
resources operations, stock price, or capacity to shift in response to new 
 
 78. When researchers at MIT’s Sloan School of Management approached more than twenty 
Fortune 500 companies to review their diversity efforts, only four said yes. Thomas Kochan et al., The 
Effects of Diversity on Business Performance: Report of the Diversity Research Network, 42 Hum. 
Resources Mgmt. 1, 7–8 (2003). Permission from chief executive officers did not assure participation, 
and the four companies that went along with the study came to it with longstanding relationships with 
individual researchers. Id.  
 79. Explanations have been superficial. See, e.g., Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Race Experts: How 
Racial Etiquette, Sensitivity Training, and New Age Therapy Hijacked the Civil Rights 
Revolution 164 (2001) (attributing diversity enthusiasm to concern about international 
competitiveness); Andrew Ferguson, Chasing Rainbows, Washingtonian, Apr. 1994, at 35, 38 
(claiming that businesses installed diversity training as litigation prophylaxis to look better, should 
they face discrimination complaints). 
 80. Hansen, supra note 76, at 30 (quoting the president and CEO of a diversity consultancy). 
 81. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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developments,82 persons who make decisions about diversity in the public 
sector have manifested no desire to gather facts when these facts might 
tie their hands. 
Evidence for the prerogatives hypothesis includes the early-adopter 
embrace of diversity by one extraordinarily conservative lawyer and 
judge.83 Justice Powell came to Bakke having “forthrightly rejected the 
idea that blacks had suffered injustice,” writes legal historian Anders 
Walker.84 He even “seemed to believe that whites had themselves 
become something of a discrete and insular minority, confounded by 
their black peers and menaced by Soviets abroad.”85 In 1966, Powell 
condemned peaceful civil disobedience as practiced by Martin Luther 
King, Jr. as “lawless and indefensible.”86 A few years later, convinced 
that “the New Left, the liberal media, rebellious students on college 
campuses and, most important, Ralph Nader” gravely threatened the 
American economic system,87 Powell launched from his law practice what 
became “the business community’s campaign to transform the Supreme 
Court.”88 For Justice Powell this intersection—African Americans have 
no entitlement to redress for injustice meets managerial capitalism needs 
more freedom from constraint—made diversity-as-prerogative an 
attractive strategy, congruent with conservatism.89 Unlike affirmative 
action as a technology of repair, diversity recognizes no entitlement 
based on historical injury. It permits power holders to do as they please. 
 
 82. See Hansen, supra note 76. 
 83. See generally Janet L. Blasecki, Justice Lewis F. Powell: Swing Voter or Staunch 
Conservative?, 52 J. Pol. 530 (1990) (reviewing Justice Powell’s votes). Powell is often recalled as a 
moderate. See id. After one removes his Bakke opinion for this purpose, however, Powell’s sole liberal 
stance of any note is his 1973 vote reading the Fourteenth Amendment to limit what a state may 
criminalize with respect to abortion. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 346 (1994) 
(recounting Roe v. Wade as an aberration for Powell). On the rest of the record, see Terri Peretti, 
Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 273 passim (2010) 
(describing Powell as central to Richard Nixon’s conservative “Southern strategy”). 
 84. Anders Walker, Diversity’s Strange Career: Recovering the Racial Pluralism of Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 647, 673 (2010). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 669 (citing Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 Wash. & Lee 
L. Rev. 205, 207 (1966)). 
 87. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Sanford Levinson notes that when Powell adverted to the First Amendment in support of the 
diversity rationale, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (“[U]niversities 
must be accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the ‘robust 
exchange of ideas.’”), he envisioned a prerogative rather than a mandate. For example, employees 
certainly take diverse positions on whether a union would be desirable and on “general economic 
concerns, such as the relationship between globalization and job security or the future of the welfare 
state,” but businesses remain free to oppose First Amendment-style diversity with respect to a robust 
exchange of ideas. Levinson, supra note 69, at 589–90. 
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The prerogatives hypothesis also comports with the civil rights 
history observation that diversity started to flourish after it gained a 
foothold among key personnel in both education and employment 
following the decline of reparations-focused affirmative action.90 
According to this thesis, the Reagan presidency brought transition to 
affirmative action in the 1980s. Executive and judicial branches of the 
U.S. government withdrew from commitments to affirmative action, a 
stance that continued with the Clinton administration.91 Foreseeing that 
affirmative action would fare poorly in the courts, human resources and 
university administrators switched to a more palatable and flexible 
alternative. Victories in Bakke and Grutter, though narrow, confirmed 
the soundness of a palatability strategy: The transmutation of 
antisubordination into diversity has endured.92 
What is interesting about this thesis is the question it does not 
explore: What appeal does diversity hold for individuals who govern 
universities and places of employment? Why do they bother? Diversity 
postures undoubtedly are cheaper and less controversial than affirmative 
action, but those virtues do not explain how diversity is better for 
decisionmakers than doing nothing at all—nothing, that is to say, except 
trying to comply with antidiscrimination law. Managerial prerogative is 
an answer to this question about incentives for decisionmakers. 
More support for the prerogative hypothesis comes from the 
conservative origins of race-based affirmative action in the United 
States.93 Conventional wisdom sites the liberal beginnings of affirmative 
action policy in a 1961 executive order from President John F. Kennedy.94 
In the Republican administration preceding Kennedy’s, however, a 
commission led by Vice President Richard M. Nixon determined that 
private employers had not been doing enough to ensure equal 
 
 90. See, e.g., Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: 
Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 Am. Behav. Scientist 960, 961–62 
(1998) (focusing on equal employment and affirmative action managers in corporations); Daniel N. 
Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as Diversity Management 
at UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 985, 986–88 (2007) (identifying 
university officials as the source of strength for diversity). For discussion of the personnel thesis in a 
third venue, see Jiannbin Lee Shiao, Identifying Talent, Institutionalizing Diversity: Race and 
Philanthropy in Post-Civil Rights America (2005) (describing foundations and other nonprofits). 
 91. Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 90, at 971–75. 
 92. See infra Part III. 
 93. See Benton Williams, AT&T and the Private-Sector Origins of Private-Sector Affirmative 
Action, 20 J. Pol’y Hist. 542, 543–44 (2008). 
 94. See supra note 1. On whether Kennedy ought to be remembered as liberal, compare John F. 
Kennedy, Acceptance of the New York Liberal Party Nomination (Sept. 14, 1960), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/jfk-nyliberal (“I’m proud to 
say I’m a Liberal.”), with John F. Kennedy, Conservapedia, http://www.conservapedia.com/ 
John_F._Kennedy (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“Kennedy was basically a conservative, but he had to 
appeal to a primarily liberal base, so he offered symbols for the liberals while following a conservative 
course in foreign and domestic policy.”). 
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employment opportunity95—a finding that presupposes some voluntary 
affirmative action by business in the pre-civil rights era. Like Powell, 
whom he appointed to the Supreme Court, Nixon endorsed managerial 
prerogative.96 And like their successor-leaders within American business, 
managers in this pre-civil rights period supported versions of affirmative 
action that preserved their freedom to make decisions.97 
Court-fashioned equal protection doctrine that condemns quotas 
offers yet more support for the prerogatives hypothesis. Unless one 
accepts managerial prerogative as a good thing, it becomes hard to say just 
what about an affirmative-action plan that demands quotas for minorities 
offends the Equal Protection Clause when a no-quotas plan would not. In 
the construct now ascendant, the Constitution permits state actors to 
impose detriments on white persons because of their race98 and men 
because of their sex99 but only as long as flexibility—or what might be 
called vagueness, non-accountability, or even arbitrariness and caprice—
accompanies this discrimination. Quotas, which constrain discretion by the 
state, appear to comport better than flexibility with the rule of law.100 
Diversity doctrine nevertheless perceives the quota, an approach to 
affirmative action that curbs prerogative, as unconstitutional.101 
B. Happy Empirical Claims 
Launching the diversity rationale for affirmative action, Justice 
Powell endorsed the proposition that diversity causes desirable social 
consequences by reprinting, as an appendix to his opinion, a summary of 
an admissions policy in use at Harvard University.102 The president of 
Harvard at the time that Bakke was decided, Derek Bok, went on to say 
more about the uses of diversity in higher education in a much-cited 
book co-authored with William G. Bowen, who had served as president 
at Princeton when Bok led Harvard.103 Bok and Bowen, working with an 
 
 95. Yuill, supra note 1, at 36. 
 96. See John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and 
Justice in America 177–221 (1996) (exploring Nixon’s motives). 
 97. See Yuill, supra note 1, at 37; see also Terry H. Anderson, The Pursuit of Fairness: A 
History of Affirmative Action 12 (2004) (noting partial acceptance of a racial quota imposed on 
federal contractors by the Public Works Administration in 1933). 
 98. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 320 (1978). 
 99. Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987). 
 100. See Frederick F. Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 276 (2003) (“When ‘the 
rule of law’ is contrasted with the ‘rule of men,’ the core idea is that individual power, creativity, 
initiative, and discretion have their dark side.”); see also Jonathan Turley, Ten Reasons We’re No 
Longer the Land of the Free, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 2012, at B1 (expressing misgivings about 
governmental “unchecked powers resting on the hope that they will be used wisely”). 
 101. Selmi, supra note 48, at 999. 
 102. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321.  
 103. William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of 
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enormous data set, declared that affirmative action in elite higher 
education had enhanced the welfare of both minority students and their 
white classmates.104 
The Shape of the River spurred other researchers post-Bakke to 
investigate the effects of diversity in higher education.105 Studies cited by 
the Court in Grutter helped to build the constitutional-law rule that 
pursuing diversity is a compelling government interest.106 Compelling, 
explained Justice O’Connor, because exposure to diversity breaks down 
stereotypes and fosters better understanding of groups; a classroom 
cannot have too much “variety of backgrounds.”107 Because graduates of 
diverse institutions emerge better prepared to navigate employment 
relationships and remunerative activities in a global economy, O’Connor 
continued, the rationale that supports affirmative action in education 
carries over into the workforce and even national security.108 
Post-Grutter measurements of diversity as a source of social gains 
continue. Although studies also link diversity in the workplace to gains in 
employees’ productivity, creativity, and quality of decisions reached,109 
education continues to occupy the lion’s share of this research. Findings 
 
Considering Race in College and University Admissions xxi–xxviii (1998). In February 2012, the 
U.S. Department of Education reported that it was investigating complaints about race-based 
preferences at both Harvard and Princeton. See Peter Schmidt, Harvard Faces New Scrutiny over 
Alleged Bias Against Asian-American Applicants, Ticker (Feb. 2, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://chronicle.com/ 
blogs/ticker/harvard-faces-new-scrutiny-over-alleged-bias-against-asian-americans. 
 104. The famed monograph reported on outcomes experienced by more than 80,000 persons who 
had entered elite institutions as undergraduates in 1951, 1976, and 1989. Bowen & Bok, supra note 103, 
at 276. “It is not often that empirical research settles any important question of public policy,” wrote 
Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer, explaining that this book established “a remarkable increase, as a 
result of [affirmative action in elite-college admissions], in the number of blacks playing important 
roles in American society, gaining higher incomes, influencing their communities.” Nathan Glazer, A 
Place for Racial Preferences, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1998, at A19. 
 105. See, e.g., Compelling Interest: Examining the Evidence on Racial Dynamics in Colleges 
and Universities (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003); Defending Diversity: Affirmative Action at 
the University of Michigan (Patricia Gurin et al. eds., 2004); Diversity Challenged: Evidence of 
the Impact of Affirmative Action (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001). 
 106. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003). 
 107. Id. at 330. 
 108. Id. at 331. 
 109. See generally Carol P. Harvey & M. June Allard, Understanding and Managing 
Diversity (5th ed. 2011) (summarizing current research); Scott E. Page, The Difference: How the 
Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies 314 (2007) (reporting on 
formal, mathematically stated studies that found a positive relation between the “cognitive diversity” 
of membership in a group and the quality of decisions the group reaches). One example of how 
cognitive diversity succeeded occurred during World War II, when English cryptographers were finally 
able to crack a difficult German code by adding new groups of people to their code-breaking team: 
mathematicians, scientists, classists, chess grand masters, and crossword addicts. Frans Johansson, 
The Medici Effect: What Elephants and Epidemics Can Teach Us About Innovation 79 (2006). 
But see Cris Wildermuth & Susan Gray, Diversity Training 16–17 (2005) (stating that the high 
productivity of demographically heterogeneous groups in the workplace is a myth). 
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about diversity in education have been overwhelmingly positive;110 new 
benefits ascribed to it continue to emerge in this literature.111 
Many empirical claims about diversity—though by no means all—rest 
on a shaky foundation.112 One flaw marring several studies is that in higher 
education at least, and probably also in other contexts that engage the 
diversity rationale, trying to demonstrate that diverse environments cause 
welfare gains is confounded by self-selection into these environments. 
Researchers cannot readily distinguish causes from effects. Persons 
already open to democratic engagement, creative thinking, learning from 
new people, and other results that researchers have linked to diversity 
initiatives might have sought diversity out and would have found it if the 
environments they chose had not offered it to them.113 This population will 
turn up overrepresented in settings like integrated campus housing, college 
courses that attract diverse enrollments, and multicultural workplaces.114 
 
 110. Mitchell J. Chang, Quality Matters: Achieving Benefits Associated with Racial Diversity 
9 (2011) (“It is nearly impossible to find a published study grounded in the field of higher education 
research that rejects Justice Powell’s diversity rationale.”); Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of 
the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at 
Selective Higher Educational Institutions, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 1229, 1243 n.43 (2008) (“Academic opinion 
is solidly behind the tremendous benefits of diversity for the education of all students.”). In other work, 
Chang casts his findings about the benefits of diversity in a two-step analysis: First, white students who 
attend diverse schools are more likely than white students who attend nondiverse schools to socialize 
with nonwhite peers; from there, “socializing with someone of a different racial group . . . contributes 
to the student’s academic development, satisfaction with college, level of cultural awareness, and 
commitment to promoting racial understanding.” Mitchell J. Chang & Alexander W. Astin, Who 
Benefits from Diversity in Higher Education?, Diversity Dig., http://www.diversityweb.org/digest/ 
w97/research.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (summarizing findings by Chang). 
 111. One study published in late 2011, for example, reported that “exposure to [fellow] students of 
diverse backgrounds” makes it more likely that a student will return to school after freshman year, and 
increases critical thinking. Dan Berrett, What Spurs Students to Stay in College and Learn? Good 
Teaching Practices and Diversity, Chron. of Higher Educ. (Nov. 6, 2011, 12:55 PM), http://chronicle. 
com/article/What-Spurs-Students-to-Stay-in/129670. 
 112. Stanley Rothman et al., Does Enrollment Diversity Improve University Education?, 15 Int’l J. 
Pub. Opinion Res. 8 (2003) (critiquing the methodology of studies that link diversity in higher 
education with positive effects, and finding that when methodological flaws are corrected, the gains 
mostly vanish). 
 113. The absence of an agreed-on definition of diversity adds to this problem. Imagine a white 
student who puts a high value on racial diversity finding herself on a virtually all-white college campus 
in a mostly-white town. The student objects to this racial composition, but agrees reluctantly to enroll 
when her parents tell her they will pay tuition to no other school. She might generate some racial 
diversity in her social life through off-campus initiatives, and cultivate diversity on fronts other than 
race—income, sexual orientation, ability/disability—among her peers at school. If after a year or two 
at college she fits the profile of a diversity-enhanced student, what gets the credit? Published 
multivariate regressions in the diversity literature offer no hypothesis that I have located. 
 114. Classmates at the same school, less committed to integration, will in turn be underrepresented 
in these environments. See generally Note, Educational Benefits Realized: Universities’ Post-
Admissions Policies and the Diversity Rationale, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 572, 572–73 (2010) (arguing that 
universities practicing affirmative action in admissions should be required to promote interaction 
among diverse groups post-enrollment). 
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Individuals emerge from diverse environments manifesting the traits they 
came in with.115 
Aware of the self-selection problem, researchers have attempted to 
install controls, but their efforts have been mostly unavailing.116 A 
randomized study of diversity in higher education—where, for example, 
cohorts would be forced into diverse versus non-diverse dormitories, or 
compelled to enroll or not enroll in certain courses—could get around 
self-selection but would clash with customs, if not rules, that assign 
prerogatives to students. Schools willing to challenge this tradition would 
need not only student cooperation but also approval of their study design 
from their institutional review boards before they could proceed.117 Even 
if a review board would approve the study, which seems unlikely,118 only 
an eccentric institution would seek to be known for taking away choice in 
campus housing or course selection. 
Moving beyond education into diversity in other settings, diversity 
research has relied on surveys, confounded by a fundamental problem 
with self-reported data: survey signaling. Respondents to questionnaires 
may suppose that paeans to diversity will meet with approval, and that 
expressing skepticism or distaste will come across as bigotry and give 
offense.119 A presumed right answer to the questions emerges. Even when 
participants respond sincerely, they may drift into a position they deem 
 
 115. One study exemplifies this problem. The University of Michigan set up an Intergroup 
Relations Program, inviting first-year undergraduates to enroll. Patricia Gurin et al., The Benefits of 
Diversity in Education for Democratic Citizenship, 60 J. Soc. Issues 17, 20 (2004). Key features of this 
optional program included intergroup communication processes in facilitated discussions. Id. at 21. 
The authors hypothesized that alumni of this program would score higher than fellow students on 
perspective-taking, understanding that difference need not be divisive, perception of 
commonalities in values between their own and other groups, mutuality in learning about 
their own and other groups, interest in politics, participation in campus politics, 
commitment to civic participation after college, and acceptance of conflict as a normal part 
of social life. 
Id. The prediction came true. Id. at 30. 
 116. Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking in College 
Students, 15 Psychol. Sci. 507, 509 (2004) (describing a controlled study that tested a diversity 
intervention which worked effectively around the self-selection problem, but reported a limited 
conclusion of small improvements in “integrative complexity”).  
 117. This constraint applies to all educational institutions that receive federal funding. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.101 (2007). 
 118. Informed consent from subjects would be virtually impossible to obtain, and enrolling 
students against their will in particular courses or keeping them out of electives they want to take 
would risk inflicting hard-to-rectify, if not irreparable, harm. See generally Mark S. Stein & Julian 
Savulescu, Welfare Versus Autonomy in Human Subjects Research, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 303 (2011). 
 119. Two British diversity trainers insist on metrics for the study of a diversity training program in 
the workplace apart from survey data of trained employees. Phil Clements & John Jones, The 
Diversity Training Handbook: A Practical Guide to Understanding and Changing Attitudes 
85 (3d ed. 2008). A private entity might look for “business benefits;” a governmental unit might assess 
public perception “or organizational performance against certain criteria. Whatever the measure, it 
needs to be specified from the word go.” Id. 
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correct or wish they held.120 Survey respondents who are not trying to 
please their questioner might be trying to please themselves.121 
Another problem with the empirical-effects literature about 
diversity is the neglected possibility that diversity could cause harm 
instead of, or in addition to, good. Researchers who investigate diversity 
look for welfare gains and often find them.122 Sometimes they report no 
gains.123 When studying higher education, however, most researchers do 
not look for losses,124 although negative findings and claims continue to 
be published.125 
Time spent in a diverse environment could correlate with bad 
effects for an individual: shorter life expectancy, worse physical or 
mental health, lower income, less wealth, lower scores on self-assessment 
of happiness, or inferior performance in one’s occupation. That diversity 
 
 120. Patricia Gurin, an acclaimed researcher of diversity in higher education, summarizes two 
studies that may have been marred by this flaw. Patricia Gurin et al., The Educational Value of 
Diversity, in Defending Diversity 97, 126 (Patricia Gurin et al. eds., 2004). In the first, a majority of 
law students at Harvard and the University of Michigan said that “‘most of their classes were better 
because of diversity’ and that they had personally benefited from this diversity.” Id. at 126. When 
medical students at Harvard and the University of California at San Francisco medical schools were 
asked similar questions, they praised diversity at an even higher rate. Id. at 127. The studies were 
published in 2001 and 2003 respectively. See id. at 126–27. Students who filled out the questionnaires 
came of age after Bakke had made diversity famous in higher education. 
 121. See Chang, supra note 110, at 15 (reporting on a study that linked “higher levels of cross-
racial interactions” with high reports from students about their “self-efficacy, academic skills, and self-
change in their capacity to engage with racial-cultural differences”). Another study, published in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, found that white students attending racially diverse 
medical schools rated themselves higher than white students at less diverse schools with respect to 
their competence to care for minority patients. Somnath Saha et al., Student Body Racial and Ethnic 
Composition and Diversity-Related Outcomes in U.S. Medical Schools, 300 JAMA 1135, 1141 (2008). 
These respondents may have assessed their skills correctly; they might also have been rationalizing 
their fit inside a school of a particular diversity level, whether low or high. 
 122. See sources cited supra notes 105, 109–110, 114, 119. 
 123. See supra note 111. 
 124. Chang, supra note 110, at 9; Gurin, supra note 120, at 127–29 (observing that the only 
scholarly study purporting to find that higher-education diversity causes harm had actually found only 
that faculty, students, and administrators were more critical of the quality of education in those 
schools that serve larger proportions of African American students); cf. Levinson, supra note 69, at 
578 (“[I]t is becoming ever more difficult to find anyone who is willing to say, in public, that 
institutional or social homogeneity is a positive good and diversity a substantive harm.”). 
 125. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing 
studies that find “heterogeneity actually impairs learning for black students”); Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown 
and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 Yale L.J. 1285, 1286 (1992) (observing that African-American 
children sometimes fare worse in integrated schools “because of discriminatory tracking programs and 
teachers’ negative attitudes toward black children”); cf. John R. Lott, Jr. et al., Peer Effects in 
Affirmative Action: Evidence from Law Student Performance, 31 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 1, 7 (2011) 
(reporting findings that minority students perform either no better or slightly worse when more fellow 
minority groups members are in their classes). One scholar has noted harms to members of minority 
groups when minority-majority schools are closed in the name of integration and their students 
relocated. Drew S. Days III, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 53, 
55 (1992). 
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in education taxes racial minorities with an extra shift of work to benefit 
the dominant cohort at their school—explaining their culture, assuaging 
anxieties, and (in the case of admission to selective schools) reassuring 
skeptics that they were qualified applicants—has long struck critics as a 
plausible drawback.126 Researchers interested in diversity might be 
disinclined to start with a gloomy premise. But any claim that an 
intervention enhances welfare is baseless when the claimant has not 
considered a contrary possibility. Harms from diversity might be absent 
in education.127 They might also be present. 
In contrast to their counterparts who study education, researchers of 
the workplace have associated diversity with negative effects or no 
effects at all.128 One text reports that although numerous studies have 
sought to prove the hypothesis that diverse groups in the workplace 
produce better outputs than homogeneous ones, all of these efforts have 
failed.129 A summary of findings about diversity in employment looked at 
multiple facets of diversity and a range of consequences seeking the 
impact of diversity on “affective, cognitive, communication, and symbolic 
processes.”130 It found a mixed record.131 Researchers also attribute strife 
and dissonance to working with colleagues perceived as different.132 
Questionable empiricism can be marshaled to support or refute any 
proposition, but the diversity rationale is peculiarly vulnerable to this 
danger. Other uses of data in the law typically emerge when both sides of 
a dispute agree that facts gathered should inform outcomes. Diversity, 
however, holds a fragile status even when it rests on solid numbers. 
Judicial suspicion of discrimination, no matter how benign, will remain in 
place even if diversity really does generate happy results. For this reason, 
lawyers and activists opposed to affirmative action can oppose the 
diversity rationale without having to challenge allegations about the 
benefits of diversity. Because an affirmative action program can usually 
be defeated without the refutation of happy empirical claims, its 
adversaries—unlike adversaries in other fields who confront unwelcome 
 
 126. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead-End, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 705, 724–25 (2008). 
 127. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law Schools: One 
Dean’s Perspective, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1549, 1553 (2011) (“Few could, or do, seriously claim that student 
diversity can somehow be viewed as an impediment to a high-quality legal education.”); Krotoszynski, 
supra note 7, at 935–36 (“Does anyone think that learning in an all-white, all-male college or university 
will ever be superior to learning in a comprehensively integrated environment?”). 
 128. Hansen, supra note 76, at 28; David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A 
New Paradigm for Managing Diversity, in Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 1–2. 
 129. Wildermuth & Gray, supra note 109, at 17. 
 130. Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads: Understanding the 
Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 402, 402 (1996). 
 131. Id. at 421. 
 132. Thomas & Ely, supra note 128, at 4–5. 
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data—can let these assertions stand with relative safety, not jeopardizing 
their chances in court. 
Happy empirical claims are politically convenient too. Consistent 
with the prerogative-for-managers function of the diversity rationale,133 
elected officials and other decisionmakers subject to public scrutiny reap 
advantages from claims about gain. These leaders can present their 
decisions to favor diversity as driven by social science rather than 
expediency. If diversity as an instrument functions well to attain 
noncontroversial ends, then applauding it is more than just an easy 
choice. Who among us prefers to be unprepared to navigate the global 
economy, or wants the next generation to feel befuddled and threatened 
by the unfamiliar? Because the term lacks definitional rigor, one can 
purport to pursue it while doing very little. 
The word hems nobody in and commits to nothing, while leaders 
can call diversity valuable, even indispensable. Public figures who 
embrace it gain shelter from political strife when the empirical claims 
they make present diversity as a nonpartisan social engine, puttering 
forward and doing good.134 Politicians of contrary stripes thus can agree 
that diversity—undefined, unmeasured, unconstrained—makes a 
population better off, even when they disagree about what to do in its 
name and when to stop doing it.135 The next Subpart observes that for 
speakers and listeners, positive rhetoric is more palatable than a protest 
against injustice. 
C. Papering over Subordination 
Just as happy empirical claims connect the diversity rationale with 
pleasant social conditions, a tactful silence about subordination and 
 
 133. See supra Part II.A. 
 134. See Jones, supra note 15, at 177 (“Everyone can feel good. No one need feel threatened or 
excluded.”). 
 135. Stances on diversity from the last two U.S. presidents, politicians from opposing parties, 
illustrate the phenomenon. Compare Bush Statement, supra note 21 (“University officials have the 
responsibility and the obligation to make a serious effort to reach out to students from all walks of 
life . . . . Schools should seek diversity by considering a broad range of factors in admissions, including 
a student’s potential and life experiences.”), with Kathy Kiely, Making Their Case: Obama Relishes 
Challenge of a “Difficult Time”, USA Today, Oct. 31, 2008, at 1A (quoting Senator Obama: “I come 
from a diverse background and so I think I understand a lot of different cultures.”). Once in office, the 
Obama administration continued to assert empirical claims. On diversity in education, see Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Education, New Guidance Supports Voluntary Efforts to Promote Diversity 
and Reduce Racial Isolation in Education (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/new-
guidance-supports-voluntary-efforts-promote-diversity-and-reduce-racial-isol (quoting Attorney General 
Eric Holder: “Diverse learning environments promote development of analytical skills, dismantle 
stereotypes, and prepare students to succeed in an increasingly interconnected world.”); on diversity in 
the workforce, see Exec. Order No. 13,583, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,847 (Aug. 18, 2011) (“[O]ur greatest 
accomplishments are achieved when diverse perspectives are brought to bear to overcome our greatest 
challenges.”). 
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oppression keeps affirmative action measures optimistic rather than 
aggrieved. Purporting to look forward rather than backward, diversity 
“begins with an implicit denial of the defender’s participation in or 
responsibility for past or contemporary racism,” objects critical race 
scholar Charles Lawrence.136 “Minorities are hired or promoted not 
because we have been unfairly treated, denied jobs, deprived of our 
lands, or beaten and brought here in chains,” according to another leader 
in this field, Richard Delgado. Enter affirmative action, buttressed by the 
diversity rationale, which “neatly diverts our attention from all those 
disagreeable details and calls for a fresh start.”137 
Diversity as a papering-over that obscures, and even denies, 
subordination occupies a vast literature.138 After Grutter constitutionalized 
diversity as a good reason for governmental discrimination—“a compelling 
interest”139—American legal scholarship about affirmative action has had 
to grapple with the relation between antisubordination, a painful 
rationale for what Justice Powell called “consideration” of categories like 
“race and ethnic origin,”140 and diversity, the alternative motive that 
treads lightly on “all those disagreeable details.”141 Presently I will have 
more to say about diversity and antisubordination functioning as both 
rivals and mutually constitutive efforts toward social progress.142 For now 
I note the anodyne nature of the rationale. Diversity is blander than 
antisubordination. 
Diversity is blander not only because the wounds of enslavement 
and government-sponsored segregation are still raw in the United States, 
but because of the subordination inherent in layers of wealth and class. 
“The problem with affirmative action is not (as is often said) that it 
violates the principles of meritocracy,” writes Walter Benn Michaels, 
describing diversity in American universities; “the problem is that it 
produces the illusion that we actually have a meritocracy.”143 By their 
presence, writes Michaels, African-American classmates tacitly testify 
that white students are there “on merit because they didn’t get there at 
the expense of any black people.”144 Soothed by a righteous message, 
 
 136. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 953. 
 137. Delgado, supra note 16, at 1223–24. 
 138. Bell, supra note 8, at 1632–33; Cho, supra note 19, at 1052; Delgado, supra note 16, at 1223; 
Lawrence, supra note 16, at 953. See generally Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 
1989, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1407, 1425 (1990) (commenting on Bakke: “Thus, in the name of a diversity that 
equates race with being a ‘farm boy from Idaho,’ admissions programs could continue to admit 
students on the basis of race.” (citations omitted)). 
 139. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
 140. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978). 
 141. Delgado, supra note 16, at 1224. 
 142. See infra Parts III & IV. 
 143. Michaels, supra note 15, at 85. 
 144. Id. 
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beneficiaries of class privilege gain an excuse from having to think about 
their wealth. 
Diversity changes the subject. For Michaels, affirmative action 
appeals to campus elites because it flatters them.145 More focused than 
Michaels on racial subordination, Derrick Bell has agreed that diversity 
in higher education admissions amounts to “a serious distraction” from 
the persistence of severe economic disadvantage, a condition that keeps 
deserving persons out of college.146 
In addition to changing the subject, diversity fosters blandness 
because it helps to smother whatever conversation about American 
distributions of wealth might otherwise arise. As Michaels notes acidly, 
“the kind of diversity produced by a larger number of poor students isn’t 
exactly the sort of thing a college can plausibly celebrate—no poor 
people’s history month, no special theme dormitories (i.e., no Poor 
House alongside Latino House and Asia House) and no special reunions 
for poor alumni.”147 The call that anti-racist initiatives announce—“to 
give up our prejudices”—may sound strenuous, but it coddles privileged 
persons in comparison to an alternative call for economic equality. 
Forestalled by diversity talk, such a demand “might require us to give up 
our money.”148 
III.  Diversity as Corrective and Distributive Justice 
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever 
has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty 
be lost in the pursuit.149 
The origin of any justice-based claim for a group is a historical 
wrong whose effects persist.150 In diction made famous by Aristotle, the 
consequences that oppress the group are violations of both corrective and 
distributive justice.151 A corrective justice claim asserts that individuals 
who are members of harmed groups have suffered unrectified wrongs. A 
distributive justice claim addresses allocation. Benefits and detriments, it 
asserts, are held in a wrongful pattern: too much for some and too little 
for others.152 Writings on reparations owed for the wrong of slavery 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Bell, supra note 8, at 1622, 1632–33. 
 147. Michaels, supra note 15, at 89. 
 148. Id. 
 149. The Federalist No. 51, at 324 (James Madison). 
 150. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 855, 865–
67 (1995) (discussing corrective justice and distributive justice rationales for affirmative action in 
higher education). 
 151. See generally Izhak Englard, Corrective and Distributive Justice: From Aristotle to 
Modern Times (2009) (examining Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics). 
 152. See Bron Raymond Taylor, Affirmative Action at Work: Law, Politics, and Ethics 40–42 
(1991) (considering corrective-justice and distributive-justice rationales for affirmative action). 
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explore the jurisprudence of this claim in a race-based context.153 Other 
groups that continue to suffer from unrectified wrongs can hold 
corrective and distributive justice claims as well. 
Understood in terms of corrective and distributive justice, diversity 
is more of an outcome than a goal. Because more than one axis of 
oppression exists in the United States and multiple redresses can be 
undertaken at the same time, rectification of subordination through 
affirmative action will make any setting more diverse. Consider, for 
example, efforts deployed to ameliorate the effects of race and sex 
discrimination in a workplace. Although interventions might seek 
antisubordination rather than diversity, reparative intervention 
necessarily installs more variety of race and sex. Even if an intervention 
addresses only one axis of subordination, such as race alone, it 
necessarily diversifies the setting.154 
Affirmative action when implemented operates as a source of 
redistribution, recognizing groups that, due to historical injustice, possess 
either too much or too little.155 For this reason, distributive justice relates 
more directly than corrective justice to the task of justifying diversity as 
affirmative-action policy. Five precepts, or premises of distribution-
focused affirmative action, help to direct and limit intervention. 
Reviewing these precepts, I consider affirmative action as a source of 
diversity in recurring settings. 
One caution before we begin: Published generalizations about the 
justice or injustice of affirmative action have struck readers as vague, 
conclusory, poorly delineated to the point of meaninglessness, or detached 
from reality.156 I acknowledge the peril and promise to engage it in the last 
Part of this Article, which considers diversity as a fact on the ground. 
 
 153. See generally Forde-Mazrui, supra note 23; Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 
84 B.U. L. Rev. 1319 (2004) (exploring distributive justice claims); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing 
the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 279 (2003) 
(reviewing the debate). 
 154. See Levinson, supra note 69, at 586. 
 155. Robert Nozick, though doubtful that affirmative action might be justified, sketched a 
rationale: 
[A]ssuming (1) that victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and 
(2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of 
being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation 
by those who benefited from the injustices (assumed to be those better off, though 
sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group), then a rough rule of 
thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to 
maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society. 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 231 (1974). 
 156. See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 
68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 939 (1997) (analyzing flaws of the diversity rationale); Walter P. Jacob, Note, 
Diversity Visas: Muddled Thinking and Pork Barrel Politics, 6 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 297, 301 (1992) 
(discussing the diversity rationale in immigration law). 
Bernstein_29 (A. Bernstein) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 3:07 PM 
228 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:101 
A.  Five Distributive Precepts 
Distributive justice makes reference to goods, drawbacks, 
advantages, disadvantages, opportunities, and restrictions generally, not 
just “resources” in the material sense.157 Because nouns in this literature 
have become cluttered with glosses and secondary meanings that occlude 
this discussion, I will refer to socially distributed conditions or things as 
“items,” a less familiar term. To start with the most basic precept: 
(1) Persons are entitled to hold their fair share of items. Holding too much 
or too many bad items, or too few or too little good items, violates 
distributive justice. 
This generalization, seeking a basic starting point, makes no 
reference to equality and does not pause over the contrast, made famous 
by Robert Nozick, of opportunities with results.158 An individual might 
hold extraordinarily low or high quantities of wealth, health, power, and 
so on without necessarily manifesting any violation of distributive justice. 
Her holding, even if very different from what other people have, could 
have resulted from distributively just antecedents. 
In pursuit of the first precept, positive law reallocates items consistent 
with some distributive goal. For example, progressive taxation (in principle 
at least) transfers wealth from the rich to the poor. Environmental 
regulation burdens one group, industry, to benefit another group, the 
public. 
Law-based redistribution typically takes multiple values into 
account. Transferring wealth from rich to poor, for example, might 
comport with an equality-of-resources distributive justice ideal,159 but 
other desiderata, both material and nonmaterial, limit this agenda.160 
Accordingly, legislation and judicial decisions that transfer wealth 
proceed with caution. They do not transfer as much as could be 
transferred; they limit the reach of government. Distributive justice thus 
both motivates and limits the redistributions of positive law. Though 
constrained, positive law undertakes these interventions. Second precept: 
(2) Positive law does, and should, endeavor to achieve distributive justice. 
The third precept recognizes social groups, or classes of persons 
subject to regulation by the law, as central to distributive justice. Rather 
than defend the precept, here I use it descriptively as an axiom of law in 
 
 157. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. & 
Pub. Aff. 283 (1983). 
 158. Nozick, supra note 155, at 161–66. 
 159. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 993, 
1108 (2004). 
 160. Among them are procedural regularity, the need to consider incentives, and rights or 
prerogatives that derive from lawful ownership. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral 
Reading of the American Constitution 11 (1996) (identifying the Constitution as a source of 
constraint). 
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action. American law herds persons into classifications. These groupings 
extend beyond the protected-class prescriptions and enforcements that it 
states in its civil rights doctrine; they are pervasive. 
Law would be unintelligible without legal statuses that give 
privileges and detriments to persons based on categories and political 
subdivisions that assign tasks to members of groups. The ideal of “a 
government of laws, not of men” becomes coherent only with reference 
to aggregation: The law strives to treat a person with reference to his 
category. Mr. Firstname Lastname stands before the law not as a set of 
one—his unique self—but as a member of some cohort. He must be 
treated as part of some pertinent class, for example: taxpayers, plaintiffs, 
appellees, respondents, voters, employers, felons, citizens, parents, or 
residents of a particular state. Third precept: (3) The groups to which 
individuals belong affect their distributive-justice entitlements to items. 
These first three precepts take us to what distributive justice, 
understood here as an impetus for state action, might wish to achieve. I 
return to what Aristotle paired with distributive justice in the 
Nicomachean Ethics: corrective justice, understood here as 
rectification.161 Scholars have labored to distinguish corrective from 
distributive justice. Cognizant of that distinction, I work where they 
overlap: Claims rooted in corrective justice identify conditions as unjust 
and seek intervention as repair. The fourth precept applies corrective 
justice to redistribution as undertaken through state action: (4) Group-
based detriments contrary to distributive justice ought to be rectified by the 
law correlatively, in the form of group-based advantage.162 
The last precept just noted recognizes the need for distributive 
schemes to guard against claims that lack a foundation in justice. 
Recognizing that law-based redistribution may encourage individuals to 
jettison memberships that do not enrich them, if they can, and assume 
advantageous ones, equal protection doctrine rightly includes mutability 
as among the variables that pertain to whether a classification is 
suspect.163 If individuals can drop or pick up membership in a group 
 
 161.  See generally Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (2011). 
 162. See generally Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 34–35 (1995) (offering a liberal 
defense of group rights). Numerous constraints, in both theory and practice, limit the force of this 
fourth precept. For difficulties in theory, see supra note 160 and accompanying text; for difficulties in 
practice, see infra Part V. Nevertheless, this precept underlies every affirmative action plan that 
aspires to comport with justice. Those who oppose affirmative action categorically must either disclaim 
any interest in justice, deny the history that affirmative action seeks to ameliorate, or deem an 
affirmative-action cure worse than the disease of injustice. See supra note 20. 
 163. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19, 220 (1982) (holding that illegal immigrants do not 
constitute a suspect class because they chose their status; their children, who made no such choice, 
come closer to suspect-class status); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (including 
immutability among the criteria for a suspect classification). For a critique of immutability in equal 
protection doctrine, see Michael A. Helfand, The Usual Suspect Classifications: Criminals, Aliens, and 
the Future of Same-Sex Marriage, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1 (2009). 
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opportunistically, leaving or joining it at little cost, then this group 
affiliation is relatively shallow; its holdings are unlikely to be a matter of 
distributive justice. 
This prospect yields a fifth precept: (5) Self-help being more consistent 
with liberty than action by the state, and action by the state being costly, the 
law ought to reserve its interventions for persons who cannot readily shed a 
detrimental group membership or acquire a beneficial one, and it ought to 
deploy its remedial powers with care. 
Priorities for action under this fifth precept of scarcity will emerge 
when decisionmakers face tradeoffs. Examples include heft (that is, 
focusing on group-based detriments that impose onerous rather than 
trivial burdens on members) and urgency (or, when aware of too many 
instances of group-based disadvantages than they can readily try to fix at 
once, decisionmakers ought to focus on what can achieve the most 
necessary repairs). 
B. Antisubordination as a Source of Diversity 
As was noted, diversity and antisubordination overlap in outcome 
rather than purpose. The two come together when claims made for 
redistribution to benefit subordinated groups are successful. Here a 
posited entitlement that meets criteria of the five precepts will justify 
redress for the group in the form of positive discrimination. The 
distributive-justice reason for affirmative action is to ameliorate unjust 
underrepresentation in a favored group. Two questions then arise for 
implementers: Which groups ought to be addressed by the scheme?164 And 
which contexts are suited to justice-focused recognition of group 
members? 
1. Which Groups? Statutory civil rights law, which contains lists of 
groups that hold claims based on their having been oppressed, at least in 
the past,165 is the best place to start answering this question.166 Corrective 
and distributive justice can modify these lists via both subtraction and 
addition. Subtraction from an affirmative action distribution—that is, 
rendering a group ineligible for beneficent intervention—becomes 
warranted when a group listed as disadvantaged in a statute has 
 
 164. See Sean A. Pager, Antisubordination of Whom? What India’s Answer Tells Us About the 
Meaning of Equality in Affirmative Action, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 289, 291 (2007) (referring to the 
“Who Question”). 
 165. Arguing that African Americans have a good claim for affirmative action, Kim Forde-Mazrui 
gives an example of this analysis by first noting detriments experienced by this group and then 
connecting those experiences to wrongful discrimination. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 23, at 695–98 
(gathering data about current social welfare); id. at 698–707 (relating these detriments to unlawful 
antecedents). 
 166. See Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations = Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex, 
62 Fla. L. Rev. 895, 933–34 (2010) (arguing that a “statutory warrant” helps to legitimize the 
imposition of detriments and benefits on groups). 
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overcome the oppression that afflicted it167 or brings no justice-based 
claim to the transfer proposed in the scheme.168 When these conditions 
pertain, the affirmative action plan ought to exclude the group from 
beneficial redistribution. As for proposed additions, their inclusion is 
limited by the fifth distributive-justice precept: Because diversity as a 
rationale for affirmative action can cause harm, it ought to be applied 
sparingly.169 
Several groups present claims for redistribution in the form of 
affirmative action. The preeminent civil rights classification, known by 
the misleading yet familiar rubric “race,” makes reference to injustices 
that vary depending on historical antecedents and their continuing 
consequences: Slavery and de jure segregation oppressed African 
Americans, for example, whereas Native peoples suffered genocide and 
forced migration.170 Sex discrimination, another venerable civil rights 
category, can justify interventions on behalf of not only women but also 
sexual-orientation and sexual-presentation minorities frequently grouped 
under acronym rubrics like LGBT. Disability law, our source for 
“otherwise qualified,” identifies another classification.171 
To deserve favorable treatment that displaces someone else, any 
individual who holds membership in an underrepresented group must be 
qualified for a place there.172 If she is unqualified, then her exclusion is 
not unjust and thus becomes ineligible for distributive-justice 
rectification. This condition persists even if the group in which she holds 
membership is underrepresented in the setting with reference to another 
denominator, such as its proportion in the population at large. 
2. Which Contexts? Antisubordination as an imperative could 
plausibly justify extraordinarily ambitious schemes of redistribution, but 
diversity as our unit of analysis blunts its radical potential. Consider, for 
example, the premise that title to land in much of the world—in the 
Western hemisphere in particular—lacks legitimacy because it rests on 
lawless seizure from, and dispossession of, indigenous peoples. From this 
relatively uncontroversial starting point one might take bold steps. State 
 
 167. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (expressing hope that the affirmative action 
measure approved by the Court might no longer be necessary in twenty-five years). 
 168. See Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 943, 
987 (2002) (calling the inclusion of Alaska Natives in a Richmond, Virginia affirmative action plan 
“reflexive or thoughtless”). 
 169. See supra note 128. 
 170. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(contending that historical wrongs support affirmative action to benefit “African Americans, 
Hispanics and Native Americans”). 
 171. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2007). 
 172. For a thoughtful assessment of how concepts of desert pervade affirmative action, see Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights 
Dialogue, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 253 (1999). 
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actors could declare land title null and void, force individuals to vacate 
the places they think they have rights to control and enjoy, and tear 
down buildings, industrial sites, and artifices like dams and mines. But 
because a seizing-and-dispossessing plan does not include diversity as we 
understand the term—we are considering a social concept concerned 
with the relative status or groups and individuals173—it lies outside the 
bounds of this discussion. Settings for diversity are necessarily shared 
and they encompass more than property holdings. To qualify as a 
diversity setting, a locus must permit members of different groups to 
coexist at least near one another and often together.174 
Social coexistence, the center of diversity, meets corrective and 
distributive justice, the basis for affirmative action aimed at redressing 
subordination, in three overlapping yet distinct ways. First, a 
subordinated group might have in the past been excluded unjustly from 
the opportunity to join decisionmaking bodies. Here, affirmative action 
would make seats at the table of authority available to members of the 
group. Electoral redistricting installed to increase minority 
representation in a diverse legislature provides an example of this 
conjunction of antisubordination with diversity.175 Corporate board 
diversity measures also illustrate this category.176 Gender quotas installed 
to foster women’s political participation offer a third example. In the 
United States and numerous other countries, certain political bodies—
legislatures, political conventions, state political committees—must, 
according to positive law or party rules, contain a stated minimum 
percentage of women.177 Of all the overlaps between diversity and 
 
 173. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 174. Because of this concern with coexistence I exclude from this diversity-meets-
antisubordination framework those instances of affirmative action that focus on distribution of spoils. 
Supreme Court decisions offer illustrations. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 
(1980). Although the affirmative action programs evaluated in these decisions may be justifiable on 
other grounds, their connection to diversity is too attenuated for that rationale to hold. 
 175. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 176. Kimberly Krawiec has led this discussion. See Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly 
D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 759, 770–
71 (2011); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 
32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 571, 593–95 (2005); Kimberly Krawiec, Critical Mass and the Decline of African-
American Men on Public Company Boards, Faculty Lounge (May 8, 2011), 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2011/05/ 
critical-mass-and-the-decline-of-african-american-men-on-public-company-boards.html. 
 177. N.Y. Elec. L. § 2-110.2 (approving of gender quotas for party leaders of state assembly 
districts, available if political parties so choose); Lisa Schnall, Note, Party Parity: A Defense of the 
Democratic Party Equal Division Rule, 13 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 381, 382–84 (2005) 
(describing quotas for women in national legislatures around the world and the Democratic Party 
national convention). 
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affirmative action, seats-at-the-table is the most pointed because it 
adverts most bluntly to wealth and power.178 
A second overlap between social coexistence on one hand and 
corrective and distributive justice on the other emphasizes the 
progressive effects of individuals’ contact with diverse cohorts. Like the 
“happy empirical claims” explored above,179 this argument for affirmative 
action posits that diversity generates benefits, but whereas happy 
empirical claims about diversity tend to avoid politics and controversy, 
this contention puts antisubordination up front. Its premise is that, other 
things being equal, a member of a subordinated group is better off in a 
group that contains members of the non-subordinated cohort: to learn 
their (dominant) folkways, become familiar and thus less threatening to 
the ascendant group, gain opportunities to exchange gifts and do favors, 
and so on. Members of the non-subordinated cohort in this perspective 
also gain from diversity: They learn, teach, and exchange. Writers have 
noted that gains to dominant groups occupy Grutter: Justice O’Connor 
celebrated racial diversity as useful to the (white) persons who fill and 
lead elite universities, big business, and national security.180 In principle, 
however, members of subordinated groups also gain from diversity. This 
category of interchange and exchange describes two major settings where 
the diversity rationale thrives: education and employment. 
A third overlap between justice and diversity relates to the public 
status of subordinated groups. Here we may return to the concern for 
speech and expression that impelled Justice Powell to embrace the 
modern diversity rationale in Bakke. Powell, as was noted, pointedly 
never linked diversity and antisubordination, but his reasoning functions 
to rectify an injustice: Environments that lack diversity prop up rigid, 
oppressive, reductive misperceptions of subordinated groups. Whenever 
groups of persons are excluded from—or are grossly underrepresented 
in—a setting, their members’ voices are less heard. Diversity mixes these 
persons with dominant cohorts, expressing a progressive message that 
can effectively rebut misinformation. 
The setting of broadcast licenses illustrates this overlap. Decades 
after the Supreme Court upheld an affirmative action scheme to promote 
diversity in broadcasting, researchers continue to state that women and 
 
 178. This political force emerges in the caution that is manifested whenever advocates press for 
seats-at-the-table diversity. Corporate board initiatives as practiced in the United States eschew quotas 
but speak relatively explicitly about subordination; political participation minimums for women, at 
least in the United States, make no reference to subordination but embrace a quota; race-conscious 
electoral districts become enacted with neither quotas nor overt statements about subordination. 
Quotas buttressed by a protest about subordination do not—and apparently cannot—exist in 
American affirmative action. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra Part II.B. 
 180. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003); Garda, supra note 72, at 607–08; Nunn, supra 
note 126, at 724. 
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racial minorities are underrepresented among license holders.181 
Observers decry the depiction of both racial minorities and women in 
media as deficient.182 These reports suggest a relation between low 
ownership of this communication technology and poor treatment in the 
content it disseminates. Put more positively, a transfer of broadcast 
licenses in favor of racial minorities and women can enhance justice in 
how these groups appear in public media. 
These settings that fill affirmative action debates—education, the 
workplace, corporate boards, broadcast licensing—present multiple 
instances of where justice and diversity intersect. For example, although I 
have offered diversity in university admissions as an example of the 
second type of overlap—gains made from bringing together dominant 
and subordinated groups to coexist and learn from one another—
diversity in university admissions also illustrates the other two types of 
overlap: Reallocating places in a selective educational institution changes 
who sits at the decisionmaking table, the first overlap, and also influences 
the expressions and representations present in the third. 
Constrained by the third distributive precept that encourages 
parsimony, viewpoint diversity offers a good example of this third 
possibility. Enlarging the range or quantity of opinions and perspectives 
might enhance distributive justice. It need not do so, however. 
Proponents of extending the diversity rationale to variety in viewpoints 
must demonstrate the gains to distributive justice in what they prescribe. 
Corporate boards might be a place where this kind of diversity would 
increase distributive justice.183 In other contexts, a person’s viewpoint 
might be too vaguely defined—or too mutable or open to opportunistic 
embrace or abandonment184—to withstand an inquiry into its effect on 
 
 181. Eric Klinenberg, Fighting for Air: The Battle to Control America’s Media 28 (2007) 
(reporting 2005 statistics about low ownership rates for both minorities and women); Caridad Austin, 
Note, Overwhelmed by Big Consolidation: Bringing Back Regulation to Increase Diversity in 
Programming That Serves Minority Audiences, 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 733, 734 (2011). 
 182. Martha M. Lauzen et al., Constructing Gender Stereotypes Through Social Roles in Prime-Time 
Television, 52 J. Broad. & Elec. Media, June 2008, at 200; Greg Braxton, Networks Still Struggling with 
Diversity, Study Says; Television Children’s Advocacy Group Sees Areas for Improvement amid Some 
Positive Developments, L.A. Times, July 18, 2000, at Part F. 
 183. One scholar identifies an end similar to distributive justice—“a law and social equity 
rationale”—that supports increasing the “worldview diversity” of board members. Regina F. Burch, 
Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity Rationale, 42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 585, 
597 (2011). According to this rationale, the ascendant worldview inside American boardrooms has 
been too fond of risk, with deleterious effects on the national economy; more worldview diversity 
would bring in prudence. Id. at 615–20; see Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective 
Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 465, 465 
(2007) (reporting on “the white male effect,” which posits that “white men fear various risks less than 
women and minorities”). 
 184. On immutability, see supra note 163. Equal protection doctrine recognizes that a 
characteristic need not be immutable to gain recognition as “suspect.” See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 
875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging uncertainty about the mutability of homosexual 
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distributive justice. Religious diversity presents another example. 
Scholars who advocate for it have not yet formed a justice-based 
argument.185 Members of religious groups might have a claim in 
distributive justice for affirmative action, but proponents of this shift in 
resources need to say why. 
IV.  Justifying Diversity with Its Analogues 
Advocates for diversity remain coy, or perhaps undecided, about the 
fundamentals they value. They eschew commitments on such basics as 
the type of variety they pursue and how much variation within a 
regulated population will suffice to effect the rationale.186 We have noted 
the appeal of this flexibility and indeterminacy to institutional 
decisionmakers.187 Though useful on the ground, flexibility and 
indeterminacy comes at the expense of principle. Attention to contrary 
virtues—including candor, clarity, and fidelity to ideals—can make 
diversity principled rather than merely expedient. This Part surveys 
ideals that diversity advances. 
In saying that “diversity advances” various ideals, I do not add to 
what the last Part called happy empirical claims.188 Diversity as policy can 
certainly fail; it can also cause harm. Rather than make promises, then, this 
Part considers alignments of principle between diversity and other values 
esteemed in American civic life.189 They include pluralism, separation of 
 
orientation). Courts, however, expect membership in a claimant’s group to be relatively durable and 
hard to exit. See generally Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1483, 1489 (2011) (proposing that federal courts interpret 
statutory employment law to prohibit discrimination on the basis of an immutable characteristic, 
defined as “(1) a characteristic that is an accident of birth, or (2) a characteristic that is unchangeable 
or so fundamental to personal identity that workers effectively cannot and should not be required to 
change it for employment purposes”). 
 185. Cf. Levinson, supra note 69, at 601 (arguing that the best justification for affirmative action is 
a claim of historical mistreatment). 
 186. Chen, supra note 17; Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 
4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 881, 883 (1996) (“If Bakke was meant to promote diversity of culture per 
se, then it rapidly becomes unmanageable, as scores or hundreds of cultures justly claim equal 
representation under affirmative action plans . . . .”). 
 187. See supra Part II.A. 
 188. See supra Part II.B. 
 189. Thus although this Part shares common ground with David Orentlicher, Diversity: A 
Fundamental American Principle, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 777 (2005), it draws a narrower conclusion. Professor 
Orentlicher praises diversity, relating it to analogues that I will consider presently—including 
federalism, separation of powers, and markets—and concludes that diversity “plays a fundamental role 
in the American structure of government and ideal of a free enterprise economic system because it 
both promotes good outcomes and prevents socially harmful behavior.” Id. at 812. As noted, I worry 
about happy empirical claims; the “good outcomes” that diversity “promotes” are far from certain. See 
supra Part II.B. Moreover, in my view distributive justice, a topic absent from Orentlicher’s article, is 
needed to justify diversity regardless of whether one rejects the antisubordination thesis stated in this 
Part. 
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powers, and other sources of decentralization. This discussion also 
considers doctrines in American law that give effect to these values. 
A. Pluralism 
Diversity can enhance social and political life by augmenting variety 
where variety is desirable. The term pluralism refers to this pursuit. 
Literatures in philosophy, juxtaposing pluralistic moral theories against 
monistic ones,190 acknowledge the strengths of both. Monism offers 
commensurability and cohesion; it supplies a yardstick by which 
competing alternatives can be measured. Ancient thought, as recorded in 
the Old and New Testaments as well as writings of the Greeks and their 
Roman successors, celebrated monism: It had no use for diversity of 
peoples, beliefs, or values.191 The baleful Tower of Babel states an 
enduring ancient conception of pluralism as destructive.192 Throughout 
history, pluralism as a source of social good has had far fewer adherents 
than monism.193 
Yet even antiquity records philosophical support for pluralism as a 
source of wisdom. When Aristotle—hardly a champion of minorities—
asked rhetorically whether “all slavery [is] a violation of nature,”194 his 
answer was a resounding “no.” “[F]rom the hour of their birth, some are 
marked out for subjection, others for rule.”195 And yet decisions and 
deliberations gain strength from multiple participants, Aristotle wrote, 
“just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided 
out of a single purse.”196 
Contemporary arguments that defend pluralism encourage attention 
to “those differences in values, attributes, or activities among individuals 
or groups that a particular society deems salient,” which is how Peter 
Schuck defined diversity.197 With this understanding as background, I 
make four claims for pluralism. All pertain to contemporary applications 
of diversity. 
1. Variation as expansion. “The common thread is the idea that 
morality should not be stifling in various possible ways,” writes 
 
 190. See generally Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kantian Pluralism, 102 Ethics 743, 743–45 (1992) (contrasting 
pluralistic and monistic theories). 
 191. Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived Values of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1915, 
1917–19 (2001). 
 192. Id. at 1917. 
 193. See generally Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity: The Birth of Political Science in 
Ancient Greek Thought (1992) (exploring political traditions that emphasize unity and harmony). 
 194. Aristotle’s Politics 58 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at Book III, Part xi 60; see also Saxonhouse, supra note 193, at 212–14 (noting that on this 
point Aristotle diverged from his teacher and mentor, Plato). 
 197. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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philosopher Thomas E. Hill, Jr.198 “Pluralist theories, it may be supposed, 
affirm a less stifling morality insofar as they oppose unnecessary 
restrictions on liberty, dogmatic assertions of moral truth, and moralistic 
judgments about other cultures and the life-styles chosen by other 
individuals.”199 Whether diversity among groups of persons generates or 
encourages diversity as resistance to “stifling morality” is of course an 
unresolved question. Hill’s reference to “moralistic judgments about 
other cultures,” however, suggests an affirmative answer.200 Interaction 
causes diverse cohorts of persons to observe one another. Revelations of 
themselves mixed with exposure to other groups gives them context to 
understand the relations between the antecedents and behaviors of 
unfamiliar sectors. 
2. Insights into the veil of ignorance. Here I refer to the famous 
construct of John Rawls that, building on work by the economist John C. 
Harsanyi, asks which opinions and preferences about social welfare 
individuals would reach when they do not know what their position in 
their society would be.201 Rawls applied to this inquiry “the difference 
principle,”202 which, he argued, leads these individuals to support welfare-
state interventions. Because they could be destitute and powerless, they 
would choose to guard against misery by accepting constraints and taxes 
that burden the fortunate cohort. 
Diversity as an ambient condition enhances the answers that 
respondents would give to the hypothetical question. Rawls had invited 
his readers to ponder deep steppes of ignorance: The human being he 
posited does not know “his place in society, his class position or social 
status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like.”203 Behind their 
veil of ignorance, individuals living in conditions of diversity still do not 
know their own place and their own fortune in the state-to-be. Exposure 
to different groups of persons educates them about the stakes in their 
answer, however; proximity to varied groups gives the Rawlsian 
respondent insight into characteristics that bear on distributive 
outcomes.204 Diversity as an ambient condition might also make these 
 
 198. Hill, supra note 190, at 749. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136 (1971); John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare 
Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. Pol. Econ. 434, 435 (1953) (broaching the question 
of “what sort of society one would prefer if one had an equal chance of being ‘put in the place of’ any 
particular member of the society”). 
 202. Rawls, supra note 201, at 75–83. 
 203. Id. at 137. 
 204. Elsewhere I have noted that attention to diversity also opens the questions of whether the 
veil-of-ignorance premise is coherent and how it pertains to existing sources of identity: 
Affiliative homo sapiens cannot survive without personal relationships, but group identities 
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respondents’ answers less predictable than what Rawls had presumed.205 
The veil of ignorance is more than a metaphor for academics. It explains 
origins and bases of some policies in place.206 Diversity gives it more 
substance. 
3. Peace. Regardless of whether policymakers prescribe, proscribe, 
or ignore diversity, they live and function in a world filled with human 
variety. A power holder resisting diversity even by the most egregious 
means (such as de jure segregation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide) will 
fail to undo this variegation, and less egregious forms of resistance will 
have less effect. In this sense, what I have in the previous paragraph 
called “diversity as an ambient condition” always exists; although I have 
commended it as a choice, it cannot be avoided. And once diversity is 
understood as a fixture, it becomes more desirable as a choice, because 
the installed type of diversity prepares an individual to live better in a 
world that contains diversity as a fixture. 
The philosopher Henry Hardy, writing about moral pluralism, puts 
the point this way: A person “in the grip of a monist view of morality and 
politics” will think of his own commitments as universal, never 
idiosyncratic.207 People who differ will appear 
mistaken or flawed rather than as having an equally valid take on life, 
and this in turn will tend to generate conflict, resentment, suspicion, 
rejection rather than tolerance, accommodation, receptivity, 
compromise. But if I am a pluralist I will accept or welcome different 
moral conceptions rather than feeling threatened by them.208 
Let me acknowledge promptly that variety in human demographics is 
different from variety in moral stances. Not every claim for moral 
pluralism can be applied to diversity as a social intervention. Hardy is 
correct to say, however, that “tolerance, accommodation, receptivity, 
[and] compromise” fit better with pluralism than monism. Diversity, 
 
press harder on the consciousness of subordinated people—such that, as a general rule, 
white Americans give relatively little thought to their race, American Protestants tend to 
view their religious identity in spiritual terms rather than as an immutable marker of who 
they are, and heterosexual men are not much preoccupied with gender and sexual 
orientation. Every human being is endowed with particularistic traits, but some groups 
experience their particulars more consciously and intensely than others . . . . 
Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 445, 468–69 (1997). 
 205. When Harsanyi asked the same veil-of-ignorance question in 1953, he reached a different 
answer from the welfare-state response that Rawls had chosen. Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the 
Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1315, 
1326–28 (2004) (noting that Harsanyi reached his answer by applying utilitarian analysis; he envisioned 
himself as an average member of the hypothetical society, rather than someone at its ebb). 
 206. See id. at 1327 n.67. 
 207. Henry Hardy, Isaiah Berlin’s Key Idea, The Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library, http://berlin. 
wolf.ox.ac.uk/writings_on_ib/hhonib/isaiah_berlin%27s_key_idea.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 208. Id. 
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which instantiates pluralism in a social setting, tells individuals that they 
have to get along. 
4. Moral seriousness. Similar to how diversity has been misunderstood 
and misused as a vaguer and cheerier substitute for affirmative action,209 
pluralism has been misconstrued: Detractors equate it with relativism.210 
One noted defense of pluralism against the charge of relativism lends 
value to the task of making diversity principled. In his last essay, Isaiah 
Berlin distinguished pluralism from relativism on the ground that “the 
multiple values [present in pluralism] are objective, part of the essence of 
humanity rather than arbitrary creations of men’s subjective fancies.”211 
A reader can quibble with the diction—“objective” and “the essence of 
humanity” have grown fraught since Berlin’s day—but the core stays in 
place: Not every purported value or preference will deserve recognition 
within pluralism.212 And not every form of variation warrants recognition 
in a diversity scheme. I shall say more on the point below. For now, the 
distinction between pluralism, a profound value, and relativism, a 
shallow one, offers precedent for understanding diversity as principled 
rather than (or in addition to) anodyne. 
B. Separation of Powers: Rereading FEDERALIST NO. 51 
One instance of diversity that enjoys deep public approval is 
separation of powers.213 The national government in the United States 
takes a tripartite form—executive, legislative, and judicial—in which the 
sphere of action for each sector is written into the Constitution and also 
fills considerable decisional law.214 Pluralism within units of government, 
in this view, generates more strength than would exist in a governmental 
monolith. Federalist No. 51, a foundational document for the United 
States, defends checks and balances as ultimately more generative of 
stability than an undivided government, even though the experience of 
being checked and balanced by two rivals is costly for any sector in the 
scheme.215 
 
 209. See supra Part II.B. 
 210. Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 329, 336 (2007) (gathering sources). 
 211. Isaiah Berlin, Isaiah Berlin on Pluralism, University of Texas, http://www.cs.utexas.edu/ 
users/vl/notes/berlin.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 212. By way of example from Berlin: “I like my coffee with milk and you like it without; I am in 
favor of kindness and you prefer concentration camps.” Id. 
 213. “It is safe to say that a respect for the principle of separation of powers is deeply ingrained in 
every American.” See Teaching with Documents: Constitutional Issues: Separation of Powers, National 
Archives, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/separation-powers (last visited Oct. 2, 2012); see also 
Separation of Powers—An Overview, National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
legislatures-elections/legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 214. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 
1939, 1943–44 (2011). 
 215. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 149, at 320–25. 
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Returning to Federalist No. 51 is instructive for readers who seek 
precedents for diversity as a rationale for actions that reallocate, because 
its embrace of variety and divergence among power holders goes well 
beyond the checks-and-balances threesome familiar from American 
civics. Its author, identified as James Madison, starts with the individual 
unit in the scheme: “[E]ach department should have a will of its own.”216 
Acknowledging that diversity is a source of resentment and pain, 
Madison recognizes that having a will of one’s own necessarily creates 
agendas,217 and he argues for giving each unit the power to resist what it 
perceives as encroachments. His famed sentence, “Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition,”218 is an antithesis of the anodyne diversity 
surveyed earlier in this Article. Diversity hurts, as Madison knew. It 
inflicts detriment.219 
In addition to recognizing pain, Federalist No. 51 counts many more 
stakeholders than the three-branches scheme might first appear to 
include. Diversity flourishes throughout the plan of government 
presented: Madison finds strength in the diversity of federalism, whereby 
states and the national government regulate and respond to the 
population, internal diversity originating inside the branches of 
government (for example, the divergent districts that send 
representatives to Congress), and diversity in society itself, which brings 
variety to inputs and pressures that influence all the branches.220 
Continuing this breadth, separation of powers has an informal 
meaning extending beyond units of government. Individuals participate 
in social settings qua individuals, but also as members of subgroups. 
Memberships are ascribed to them, and they in turn ascribe memberships 
to other individuals—even when they sincerely abjure prejudice, 
stereotyping, and social hierarchy. When individuals form cohorts, it 
becomes possible to consider the relative power of each group, 
trajectories of power in the immediate future, the formation of coalitions, 
and other identity-forming political conditions. Increasing diversity can 
increase the types of powers that are amenable to separation, both in the 
aggregate and for particular cohorts. 
 
 216. Id. at 321. 
 217. Agendas extend beyond what the department can do by itself; for example, the department 
might want another branch of government to take action. See generally Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. 
Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 Yale L.J. 350 (2011) 
(praising separation of powers for impelling units and branches of government to challenge one 
another and thereby overcoming passivity). 
 218. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 149, at 322. 
 219. See generally supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text. 
 220. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 149, at 324. 
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C. Diversity as Instrumental to Wealth and Safety 
In refraining from making a claim that diversity delivers positive 
consequences,221 this Article has hewn to a belief that any generalization 
about increasing wealth and safety through diversity must be stated 
narrowly and with care. Diverging from Part III, which used diversity to 
argue for intervention aimed at rectification and distributive justice, this 
Part confines itself to description and eschews recommendations. 
Although I refrain from endorsing the contention that diversity 
delivers wealth and safety, the writings that make this claim help to 
justify diversity. Because they embrace an agenda more conservative 
than the left-of-center pursuit related in the last Part, they expand a 
circle of supporters. At this level diversity transcends ideology; it belongs 
to no faction. 
1. Wealth. Building on work by the economist and philosopher 
Friedrich Hayek that praised the common law—in contrast to the civil 
law—as a nurturant of markets and economic vitality,222 legal scholars 
have argued that the common law is an engine of prosperity that will, 
ceteris paribus, generate more prosperity in a nation-state than the civil 
law.223 For Hayek, civil law is relatively inclined to fetter individual 
choice, whereas the judges who made the common law in England, 
fearing incursion by the Stuart monarchs, stood up staunchly for 
property and contract rights and thus laid a foundation for capitalism.224 
Whether or not Hayek read English history accurately has been 
debated,225 but this criticism does not challenge his linkages among 
markets, libertarian political theory, the United States as a common law 
jurisdiction, and diversity. 
Diversity relates more directly to wealth in modern portfolio theory, 
which in its most basic application encourages investors to choose 
multiple types of holdings.226 Like other analogues to the diversity 
 
 221. See supra note 122, 188–189 and accompanying text. 
 222. Friedrich A. Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order 81 (1973). 
 223. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 
30 J. Legal Stud. 503, 523 (2001) (concluding that common law countries experienced faster economic 
growth than civil law countries during 1960–1992); id. at 503–04 (reporting on other research that 
found stronger investor protections in common law legal systems than their civilian counterparts); 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking Law’s Relationship to the Economy—
Implications for Policy, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 831, 832 (2009) (summarizing, without endorsing, this 
literature). 
 224. Mahoney, supra note 223, at 504–05. 
 225. Compare Ronald Hamowy, F.A. Hayek and the Common Law, 23 Cato J. 241, 262 (2003) 
(concluding that Hayek overstated the power of the common law), with Mahoney, supra note 223, at 
504 (concluding that Hayek’s views “are correct as a matter of legal history”). 
 226. The classic articulation of this idea is Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. Fin. 77, 89 
(1952). For a contemporary expression, see Diversify Your Portfolio, Fidelity https://www.fidelity.com/ 
fixed-income-bonds/build-your-portfolio/diversify-your-portfolio (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“This 
straightforward strategy has many complex iterations, but at its root it’s simply about spreading your 
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rationale surveyed in this Part, as ideology the diversified portfolio 
enjoys wide support.227 Legal doctrine reflects and buttresses this 
enthusiasm: Although American law has no authority to tell individuals 
where to invest their money, it requires fiduciaries to pursue diversity in 
the portfolios they control.228 
2. Safety. Modern portfolio theory tells investors to diversify their 
portfolios not so much to reap earnings as to minimize volatility and 
risk.229 Diversity in a portfolio narrows the range of what wealth-related 
consequences can occur. By diluting commitments and scattering 
attention, it allows for the hedging of bets. Diversity as an investment 
strategy lives with the possibility of error, just as Federalist No. 51 
accepted the risk that wise or benevolent branches of government would 
be checked and balanced by foolish or corrupt rival units. 
Diversity understood as prudence or bets-hedging emerges in 
contemporary legal scholarship; “adaptive federalism” in the work of 
David Adelman and Kirsten Engel offers a useful instance.230 Adelman 
and Engel disagree with the claim that each type of environmental harm 
has its own optimal jurisdiction—for example, that “regulation of 
intrastate groundwater ought to be regulated by state and local 
governments, whereas climate change should be addressed at the 
international level”231—by noting that the search for a unitary regulator 
“washes out the diversity of local environmental, political, and economic 
conditions that produce unique sets of selective pressures for 
environmental regulation.”232 To Adelman and Engel, the interplay of 
state and federal environmental regulation resembles a diversified 
 
portfolio across several asset classes and sectors . . . .”). 
 227. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided 
Notion?, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 287, 314 (1994) (describing the diversified portfolio as favored by 
“currently popular financial theory”). 
 228. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2007) (providing that an ERISA “fiduciary shall 
discharge his duties . . . by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large 
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so”); Uniform Prudent Investor 
Act § 2 (1994) (applying modern portfolio theory); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of 
Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621, 653 (2004) (noting the consensus among judges that trustees’ duty 
of care obliges them to pursue diversified portfolios). 
 229. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of Lawyer as 
Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 281 n.148 (1983); Diversify Your Portfolio, supra 
note 226 (observing that diversification “can reduce the risk and volatility in your portfolio, ideally 
allowing you to achieve returns with less stomach-churning ups and downs along the way”). 
 230. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, in Preemption 
Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism’s Core Question 277–99 (William W. Buzbee 
ed., 2009) [hereinafter Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism]; David E. Adelman & 
Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1796, 1796–1800 (2008) [hereinafter Adelman & Engel, Adaptive 
Federalism]. 
 231. Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 230, at 1798 (citation omitted). 
 232. Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, supra note 230, at 294. 
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portfolio. Just as diversification in holdings offers safety to investors and 
sets up stronger prospects for wealth, diversification in power to regulate 
risks to the environment can generate better rules than either of the 
sovereigns could have written on its own.233 
Like popularizers of modern portfolio theory, Adelman and Engel 
focus on risks and threats. Their illustrations of how redundancy has 
succeeded focus on dangers to the environment that one jurisdiction 
overlooked or ignored and another pounced on.234 Similarly, William 
Buzbee celebrates local initiatives that filled the void of federal neglect 
in regulating contaminated industrial wastelands (“brownfield sites”) in 
urban areas.235 Diversity in the sources of environmental regulation is, 
among other things, more regulation. Because regulation, in the authors’ 
view, enhances safety, the diversity they embrace has the desirable effect 
of inhibiting dangerous conduct. 
In this context, consider the larger genre in which “adaptive 
federalism” finds its home. Robert Ahdieh, describing what he labels 
“the new federalism,”236 gathers more than a dozen specimens of the 
phenomenon as expounded by contemporary legal scholars. The 
collection presents a variety of overlaps in governance: 
Paul Berman’s studies of “cosmopolitan pluralism”; Benedict 
Kingsbury’s and Richard Stewart’s explorations of global administrative 
law; George Bermann’s analysis of transatlantic regulatory cooperation; 
the study of transnational networks by Anne-Marie Slaughter and 
others; studies of the European Union, including especially work on the 
judiciary, on “comitology,” and on framework statutes, the open method 
of coordination, and related paradigms of “soft law”; related to the 
latter, explorations by Chuck Sabel and others of democratic 
experimentalism; the varied new governance literature; studies of cross-
jurisdictional “engagement”; Greg Shaffer’s research on “transnational 
transformations of the state”; work on the interaction of international 
and national tribunals; strands of the latter literature focused on judicial 
citation of international and foreign authority and on broader questions 
of legitimacy; the discourse of global constitutionalism; Harold Koh’s 
studies of transnational legal process; Hari Osofsky’s analysis of 
multiscalar governance; and a growing literature on increasingly complex 
dynamics of federalism within the United States, in constitutional law, 
corporate law, environmental law, and other areas.237 
Ahdieh initially groups these classifications under the rubric of “realities 
and conceptions of jurisdiction.”238 Quickly, however, he notes the 
 
 233. Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 230, at 1820. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, supra note 230, at 283 (citing William 
W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 108, 122–26 (2005)). 
 236. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing 
Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 Emory L.J. 1 (2007). 
 237. Id. at 2–3 (citations omitted). 
 238. Id. at 1. 
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inadequacy of that narrow term: The stakes in the fields surveyed include 
“community definition, sovereignty, and legitimacy.”239 
They also present diversity as safety. Multiple sources of regulation 
mean more regulation, and from there generate more control. Units 
recognized as institutions within the law—states (under formal 
federalism), nation-states (in transnational governance), corporations, 
legislatures, judicial systems—all hold power within “intersystemic 
governance.”240 To be sure, diversity in its simplest horizontal form can 
loosen controls. For example, jurisdictions can compete to become the 
least demanding place to do business, as “race to the bottom” literatures 
attest.241 Critics associate globalization with freeing businesses to pay 
lower wages and elude environmental regulations.242 
Yet as new-federalist writings have shown, the number and force of 
controls on persons and entities is greater than can be counted in formal 
delineations of regulatory authority. Intersystemic governance means 
more governance. If more regulation equals more safety, then diversity 
becomes a source of safety as well as wealth. 
D. Diversity in American Law 
1. Fostering Markets. Whole fields of American law enforce the 
proposition that market competition is desirable and warrants 
encouragement. Preeminent among these fields is antitrust, which 
proscribes actions by firms in restraint of competition, but others also 
share the premise: securities law, which demands disclosures that inform 
the decision to buy stock on a public exchange; consumer law, which 
posits that buyers of goods and services are entitled to merchantability, 
truth in packaging and marketing, and the rendering of information; and 
commercial law, regulated by a comprehensive model statute that set out 
to mirror and encourage the conditions of healthy markets. The “fresh 
start” that bankruptcy promises debtors, the recording of real estate 
holdings (along with their sale prices and other dollar amounts) and 
security interests in collateral, the enforcement of contracts, the widening 
types of intellectual property that may be owned and conveyed, the large 
menu of alternative dispute resolution opportunities available to 
 
 239. Id. (quoting Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311, 
319 (2002)). 
 240. The term is Ahdieh’s. See id. 
 241. Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, The Three Parties in the Race to the Bottom: Host 
Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies, 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 153 (2005); Richard 
L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992). 
 242. Charles Derber, People Before Profit: The New Globalization in an Era of Terror, Big 
Money, and Economic Crisis 148–51 (2002) (advocating a “global New Deal” in response); Adam 
Warden, A Brief History of the Anti-Globalization Movement, 12 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 237, 
241–242 (2004) (criticizing the World Trade Organization for indifference to this problem). 
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businesses, among many other conditions, express enthusiasm for 
transactions and exchanges. 
Markets and diversity are mutually constitutive. Divergent tastes 
and valuations make transactions possible. The seller of a used car, for 
example, would rather have the cash value of that commodity than the 
commodity itself; the buyer prefers the car to the cash; and the deal will 
close—leaving both seller and buyer better off and increasing wealth—
because preferences are different rather than the same. Bigger 
commercial venues, such as stock exchanges, cause diverse preferences to 
emerge, influence prices, and be influenced in response. Thus diversity 
fosters markets. Markets, in turn, foster diversity.243 
2. Flora and Fauna: Diversity in Environmental Law. Both domestic 
and international environmental legal instruments strive to protect 
diversity. In domestic law, the Endangered Species Act endorses and 
fosters variety among species of animals and plants.244 Many states add 
their own endangered species statutes.245 The Convention on Biological 
Diversity, a treaty opened by the United Nations in 1992, brings diversity 
to international environmental law and has 168 signatory nation-states.246 
Signed, though not ratified, by the United States, the Convention 
associates environmental diversity with shelter, food, water, the cleanup 
of wastes, protection against climatic extremes, and sustainability 
generally.247 Implicitly this treaty posits that losses of genetic variation, 
extinction of animal and plant species, and declines in the variety of 
environments—mangroves, coral reefs, rain forest—threaten human life 
even when the value of any particular loss cannot be quantified or linked 
directly to a hazard. 
Like diversity as an affirmative action rationale, diversity in 
environmentalism could be misperceived as a rhetorical rather than 
substantive development. Activists started to talk about biodiversity, one 
might suppose, because established nouns like “pollution” or 
 
 243. Being aware of the array of goods on offer, in other words, opens individuals to newer 
possibilities and encourages them to prefer variety over homogeneity. Markets and market-thinking 
also support diversity as a rationale for affirmative action. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (associating racial and ethnic diversity in the classroom with a more robust 
marketplace of ideas); supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text (observing that corporation managers 
endorse workplace diversity as tending to improve sales and commercial relations). 
 244. The statute is understood to have this goal. See Anna T. Moritz et al., Biodiversity Baking and 
Boiling: Endangered Species Act Turning down the Heat, 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 205, 234–35 (2008); John 
Copeland Nagle, The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law, 24 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 203, 204 (2009). 
 245. Robert B. McKinstry Jr. et al., Legal Tools That Provide Direct Protection for Elements of 
Biodiversity, 16 Widener L.J. 909, 914 (2007) (lamenting that the authors’ home state, Pennsylvania, is 
not among them). 
 246. List of Parties, Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/ 
list (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 247. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustaining Life on Earth: How 
the Convention on Biological Diversity Promotes Nature and Human Well-Being (2000). 
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“conservation” had grown dull, or perhaps to leverage the faddish 
popularity of diversity in other contexts like education or the workplace. 
Even if this genesis of the term is accurate, however, diversity in 
environmental law amounts to much more than just another buzzword. 
Environmental diversity does not limit itself to the tallying of plant and 
animal classifications. It can be defined, codified, and measured by 
legislators and researchers.248 It favors plurality, variety, multiplicity, and 
divergences; it disfavors uniformity and homogeneity. 
V.  Justifying Diversity in Action 
The preceding Parts have defended diversity as a rationale for 
positive discrimination at two levels: first, as corrective and distributive 
justice, the defense offered in Part III, and, second, as congruent with 
well-accepted tenets, norms, policies, and political conditions as 
elaborated in Part IV. We may now consider how theory reckons with 
diversity reality on the ground. Toward that end, this Part discusses three 
instances of diversity in action. 
A. Questions of Administrability 
Here we look at diversity as the last rationale standing, the only 
broadscale reason for discrimination that the U.S. Supreme Court 
currently condones.249 As expressed in the Court’s foundational 
jurisprudence on point, the Powell opinion in Bakke, diversity is a 
uniquely nimble instrument. It sidesteps the hurt and division associated 
with remembering subordination and group-based oppression. 
Its power to evade is both a flaw and a virtue.250 Several progressive 
writers who oppose the diversity rationale for, among other things, its 
failure to grapple with historical injustice, favor it on the ground that 
there is no alternative. Reminiscent of the 2004 town hall meeting where 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld infamously told U.S. soldiers 
stationed in Kuwait that “you go to war with the Army you have,”251 
these supporters of affirmative action would have preferred a different 
device but accept the one available. They have concluded that diversity is 
easier than antisubordination to administer: less provocative, less 
controversial, more optimistic. Looking forward rather than backward, 
and adverting to positive rather than negative conditions, it reaches 
 
 248. See generally Nagle, supra note 244 (defining biodiversity and comparing a selection of 
statutes to investigate how well they achieve this goal). 
 249. See supra notes 9–14. 
 250. Malamud, supra note 156, at 950–66 (exploring this point with reference to affirmative action 
for relatively prosperous African-American recipients). 
 251. William Kristol, The Defense Secretary We Have, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 2004, at A33. 
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persons who would otherwise refuse to consider any rationale that makes 
reference to distributive justice.252 
Papering over subordination can be an attractive practical 
alternative to acknowledging it. For anti-discrimination activists, writes 
Sumi Cho, diversity will have instrumental uses: It can “put a happy face 
on racial oppression” and it does not “require anyone to stipulate to 
white, heterosexual, or male privilege, thereby increasing chances for 
reaching the broadest possible membership base.”253 Other scholars 
express more frustration and dismay about papering-over as the winning 
strategy for affirmative action.254 
Diversity as an anodyne rationale has the virtue of easing 
administrability.255 Happy empirical claims might lack rigor, but many are 
plausible enough. Even if the enhanced consequences of diversity that 
researchers have celebrated might have occurred even without the 
diversity initiative because open-minded people seek out varied human 
environments and enjoy them, this possibility is more than a simple 
misreading of correlation as causation. 
For example, the premise that diversity in education or the 
workforce enhances skills and performance—a virtual truism—probably 
encourages some number of individuals to reach out a bit and add more 
demographic variety to their lives. Other things being equal, this 
outreach increases welfare. Similarly, if the diversity rationale is a 
managerial prerogative,256 then managers who like prerogatives will be 
drawn to diversity. Some will have good intentions and put good 
consequences incidentally into effect. 
Accordingly, activists who favor affirmative action out of a 
commitment to principle, described in this Article as corrective and 
distributive justice, may achieve some of what they want through 
rhetorical deployment of diversity. Other persons, such as managers of 
entities, may find anodyne diversity easier to articulate and achieve than 
any other rationale for group-focused intervention. Vague criteria and 
blandness become advantages in action. 
At the same time, emphasizing variety rather than justice has costs 
and dangers. Spokespersons who err on the side of vacuity out of caution 
forgo the chance to convince receptive individuals of a justice-based 
imperative. On the other end of the receptivity spectrum, even diversity 
 
 252. See generally Sullivan, supra note 16. 
 253. See Cho, supra note 19, at 1052. Persuaded that tactical advantage outweighed ideological 
accuracy, as an activist student Cho signed on to join the Boalt Coalition for a Diversified Faculty, 
even though she had preferred a more confrontational, backward-looking name for the group: “Boalt 
Caucus for a Desegregated Faculty.” Id. 
 254. Bell, supra note 8; Lawrence, supra note 16. 
 255. My thanks to Nelson Tebbe for making a good case on this point. 
 256. See supra Part II.A. 
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at its blandest might be insufficient to make a distributive scheme 
acceptable to the constituencies affected, leaving diversity just as 
unadministrable as affirmative action framed as antisubordination. 
Different circumstances must yield divergent levels of administrability 
for different characterizations of what diversity is doing. 
Reformers and planners who consider diction and rhetoric for their 
diversity schemes will, and in my view should, take conditions like 
receptivity into account.257 Having two categories of justification 
available—the justice contention of Part III buttressed by the analogies 
of Part IV—gives these implementers choices about what to emphasize 
when they describe their plan to constituencies. 
Administering diversity must be a work in progress—and not only 
for managers. On the empirical front, for example, researchers continue 
to investigate diversity. Evidence for the assertion that diversity achieves 
gains is likely to mount, or at least evolve, and proponents of a scheme 
must keep abreast of what social scientists find.258 As administrators, they 
deal in discomfort as well as optimism: Diversity upends complacency, 
broaches the occasional tough question, denies majority-group members 
some of their old privilege, and pushes individuals to try something new. 
B. When the Antisubordination and Variety Understandings of 
Diversity Conflict 
Decisional law on the diversity rationale tends to comport with the 
justifications presented in both the preceding Parts: When the rationale 
succeeds, courts conclude that it was right for complainants to have 
suffered detriment, even though these persons were discriminated 
against on the basis of an ascribed group membership that they did not 
choose. The correctness of this result takes two distinct forms explored in 
the two preceding Parts. First, the complainants’ group—being classed as 
white is the paradigm here—has enjoyed unjustly expanded access to the 
benefit in question. Second, these complainants ought to have been 
turned away, other things being equal, because their group membership 
leaves less room for variety in a setting where divergences are desirable. 
Members of different groups would have added multiplicity and plurality 
to a collective, but our complainant brings only more of the same. The 
trouble with justifying diversity with reference to both distributive justice 
or antisubordination, on the one hand, and variety or pluralism on the 
other, is that the use of diversity as a rationale for affirmative action can 
align with the first justification yet offend the second and vice versa. 
 
 257. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 912–13 (adverting to the risk of backlash). 
 258. For a good survey of which diversity initiatives work and do not work in a particular 
employment context, see Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender 
Equity in Law Firms, 24 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1041 (2011). 
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Disputes from higher education admissions illustrate this 
nonalignment. Contemporary admission policies manifest worry that 
absent discriminatory intervention, female and Asian-American 
applicants would enroll in excessively high numbers.259 Diversity as 
variety supports this intervention;260 distributive justice opposes it.261 A 
refusal to practice this affirmative action inverts the problem: Non-Asian 
or male complainants who needed a preference to qualify and yet were 
treated the same as Asian and female applicants could protest the 
university’s disregard for heterogeneity in denying them admission, even 
though withholding favoritism was correct as a matter of distributive 
justice. 
Implementers have no choice but to balance ad hoc the two 
understandings of diversity as a rationale for affirmative action, 
recognizing that they hold unequal weight. Justice-antisubordination will 
likely be more urgent than variety because the repair of an ongoing 
historical wrong outranks goals that would correct no unjust exclusion. 
Variety becomes more compelling, however, whenever the magnitude of 
historical injustice that oppressed a group is relatively slight. Instances of 
subordination are not created equal. 
C.  A Case Study 
In October 2011, California governor Jerry Brown announced that 
he would decline to sign a new piece of legislation. He expressed 
torment. The bill Brown vetoed had set out to resist a controversial anti-
affirmative action initiative, Proposition 209, approved in 1996 by 
California voters. As amended by Proposition 209, the California 
Constitution prohibits the state from discrimination or preferential 
treatment based on “race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin” in 
“public employment, public education, or public contracting.”262 
Proposition 209 foes had scored a victory in September 2011 when 
the California legislature passed a bill authorizing the two state 
university systems “to consider race, gender, ethnicity, and national 
origin, along with other relevant factors, in undergraduate and graduate 
admissions, to the maximum extent permitted by the 14th Amendment 
 
 259. Ilya Somin has expounded on this problem in a series of blog posts. Ilya Somin, Asian-American 
Applicants and Competing Rationales for Affirmative Action in Higher Education, The Volokh 
Conspiracy (Oct. 17, 2009, 1:54 AM), http://volokh.com/2009/10/17/asian-american-applicants-and-
competing-rationales-for-affirmative-action-in-higher-education; Ilya Somin, Immigrant Students and the 
Tension Between Two Rationales for Affirmative Action, The Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 5, 2007, 11:50 
PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1170741033.shtml; Ilya Somin, Preferences for White Males and the Diversity 
Rationale for Affirmative Action, The Volokh Conspiracy (Mar. 2, 2011, 12:29 AM), http://volokh.com/ 
2011/03/02/preferences-for-white-males-and-the-diversity-rationale-for-affirmative-action. 
 260. See supra Part III. 
 261. See supra Part IV. 
 262. Cal. Const. art. I, § 31(a).  
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to the United States Constitution, Section 31 of Article I of the 
California Constitution [the codification of Proposition 209], and 
relevant case law.”263 The bill went to the governor for signature. “I 
wholeheartedly agree with the goal of this legislation,” Brown 
declared,264 before giving two reasons for his veto decision. First, 
separation of powers doctrine means the courts, not the legislature, get 
to “determine the limits of Proposition 209.”265 Second, the pro-209 side 
would not sit still in response to the bill; it would “file more costly and 
confusing lawsuits.”266 
Diversity as justified in this Article renders this explanation for the 
veto inadequate. Perhaps the new bill did indeed clash too deeply with 
Section 31, the codification of Proposition 209, to pass state 
constitutional muster. Yet the bill specifically limited its reach: It insisted 
that whatever it authorized had to comport with Proposition 209. 
Contrary to the veto message, this bill did not decree new limits; it set 
out to stay within them. Moreover, nothing in separation of powers 
doctrine gives the executive more power than the legislature to draw 
conclusions about what each branch may do. By voting for the bill, the 
Legislature had expressed a view about its constitutional constraints. A 
contrary view by the governor holds no more weight. The second reason, 
a worry of stirring up “costly and confusing lawsuits,” is not only 
unprincipled but unrealistic: Lawsuits over the diversity rationale for 
affirmative action have been proceeding undeterred in California since 
Bakke,267 and any veto message that claims “wholeheartedly [to] agree” 
with what the killed bill seeks to do ought to refrain from calling 
anything else confusing. 
Justifying diversity would have informed the veto-or-sign dilemma. 
It could have changed the outcome. The governor’s two reasons for his 
veto have enough gravitas to engage with diversity only if we stay at the 
anodyne level.268 If diversity amounts to nothing more than prerogatives 
for managers and whitewash over a history of subordination, along with 
vague tacked-on assertions about improved consequences, then the veto 
message answers shallowness with shallowness. If, by contrast, diversity 
honors and gives effect to principled claims for the reallocation of goods, 
as I have argued in Part III, or if diversity as “a fundamental American 
 
 263. S.B. 185, 2011–12 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
 264. See Robin Wilkey, SB 185 Vetoed: Jerry Brown Vetoes Affirmative Action-Like Bill, Huffington 
Post (Dec. 8, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/09/sb-185-vetoed_n_1002099.html. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. For a sampling of the controversy as presented to California courts, see Bob Egelko, Brown 
Joins Prop. 209 Challenge, S.F. Chron., Jan. 17, 2012, at C1 (reporting the progress of a federal action 
against this initiative); San Jose Officials, Liberal Elite Try to Stop Prop. 209, San Jose Mercury 
News, Nov. 10, 1996, at 7P (reporting lawsuit filed promptly after voter approval). 
 268. See supra Part II.B. 
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principle”269 shares in the esteem enjoyed by fundamentals in the United 
States like pluralism, decentralization, and markets, as Part IV 
contended, then legislation enabling an affirmative action measure that 
enhances diversity deserves a careful response. 
State executives who accept the thesis of this Article should read a 
diversity-enhancing affirmative-action bill with attention to distributive 
justice before deciding to veto or sign it. Our hypothetical governor 
knows that an affirmative-action reallocation could fail this criterion for 
desert. Legislatures sometimes err: A proposed transfer might reward a 
group that has no real entitlement, hurt the taken-from cohort with 
unwarranted severity, or waste time and money by focusing on a trivial 
characteristic. A bad diversity-promoting affirmative-action transfer—a 
transfer inconsistent with distributive justice—is one that either does not 
ameliorate present effects of past injustice or instills only a vacuous 
heterogeneity, reminiscent of Isaiah Berlin’s “I like my coffee with milk 
and you like it without; I am in favor of kindness and you prefer 
concentration camps.”270 
Of course, only executive officers in government—state governors 
and presidents of the United States—grapple with the veto-or-sign 
dilemma. Yet justifying diversity also guides the actions of individuals 
who are not state actors. In California, for instance, Jerry Brown had 
faced a precursor to his veto question: As a California voter in 1996 
holding no elected office he had the choice, in the seclusion of a polling 
place, to oppose or support an amendment to the state constitution that 
banned benign as well as invidious discrimination. Other states have also 
put affirmative action to the electorate in the form of proposed 
constitutional amendments.271 These initiatives gain attention when they 
succeed, but others have quietly failed to engage enough voter support 
and disappeared:272 Public opinion has mattered. Apart from state action, 
many individuals have a voice on affirmative action proposals in their 
workplaces, local schools, civic volunteering, or alumni participation in 
university life. 
The exercise of affirmative-action justification works similarly for 
voters, nonstate decisionmakers, and public-sector executives like Jerry 
Brown. Our deliberator reviews a proposed instance of affirmative action 
 
 269. Orentlicher, supra note 189. 
 270. See supra note 212. 
 271. See Barbara Hoberock, Battle Is Looming on State Question, Tulsa World, Nov. 6, 2011, at 
A24 (reporting successes for affirmative-action opponents in Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona, and 
Washington). 
 272. See Missouri Anti-Affirmative Action Initiative, American Civil Liberties Union (Apr. 4, 
2008), http://aclu.org/racial-justice/missouri-anti-affirmative-action-initiative (reporting on an effort 
that failed for lack of signatures); see also Hoberock, supra note 271 (noting that Colorado voters had 
recently voted no); Amy Wood, Affirmative Action Foes: Chasing the Initiative, 21 Southern 
Changes, no. 2, 1999 at 3. 
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first with attention to corrective and distributive justice, and then with 
the understanding that affirmative action typically enhances diversity273—
paying heed to what diversity installs and promotes. Adding pluralism, 
decentralization, and alignment with the law outside civil rights to an 
assessment that starts with justice increases the chances that diversity-
promoting affirmative action will be justified.274 Should the proposal still 
fail—not enough justice, not enough heterogeneity, not enough heft in 
the heterogeneity it brings—it will have received a morally sufficient 
hearing. 
Conclusion 
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed diversity the most 
acceptable rationale for actions that take civil-rights statuses into 
account, and even though other decisionmakers—elected officials, 
business managers, heads of colleges and universities, and military 
leaders—have united to praise it, diversity still lacks justification as the 
term is used in law: “The showing or maintaining in court that one had 
sufficient reason for doing that which he is called to answer.”275 To date, 
no such justification has emerged. Amply warned that the task will be 
difficult,276 this Article has undertaken to say why imposing diversity, 
even when diversity inflicts harm, can warrant approval. 
When challenged in court by individuals who say that a diversity 
measure hurt them, users of the rationale have responded with evasion. 
For good instrumental reasons, they prefer bland affirmation to specifics. 
The widely shared belief that diversity is good while quotas are bad, for 
example, supports prerogatives for managers, who become free to 
emphasize or retreat from diversity as they please without reckoning or 
explanation. Empirical claims about the benefits of diversity might be 
accurate, but they have also begged questions, confused correlation with 
causation, and rested on dubious methodologies and insufficient 
precision. 
Implementers and the public alike find diversity more palatable 
than other justice-based rationales for affirmative action—including 
rectification, reparation, and desegregation—because talk of diversity 
avoids the bitterness of grievances that remain, to some degree, alive and 
 
 273. See supra Part III. 
 274. See supra Part IV. 
 275. V The Oxford English Dictionary 643 (Clarendon Press 1933). 
 276. Writers use a variety of gerunds to describe what the diversity rationale demands. See, e.g., 
Sanford Levinson, Wrestling with Diversity (2003) (“wrestling”); Susan Schramm-Pate & Rhonda 
Baynes Jeffries, Grappling with Diversity: Readings on Civil Rights Pedagogy and Critical 
Multiculturalism (2008) (“grappling”); Schuck, supra note 10, at v (“managing”); Braxton, supra 
note 182 (“struggling”); Ann Coulter, At the End of the Day, Diversity Has Jumped the Shark, 
Horrifically, Human Events, Nov. 23, 2009, at 6 (“reckoning”). 
Bernstein_29 (A. Bernstein) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2012 3:07 PM 
December 2012]     DIVERSITY MAY BE JUSTIFIED 253 
painful. This Article has argued that sidestepping claims of injustice is 
both a strength and a weakness of the diversity rationale: strength 
because palatability gives affirmative action enough political capital to be 
installed, and weakness because justice dodged becomes justice at best 
postponed, if not denied. 
Accordingly, I have argued, the task of justifying diversity proceeds 
on two levels. One level is reparative: Functioning as an element or at 
least a consequence of affirmative action, diversity becomes justified as a 
source of corrective and distributive justice. The other level of 
justification, using analogy, works with resemblances and parallels. 
Uncontroversial ideals of American law and politics—including 
pluralism, separation of powers, and markets—esteem multiplicity and 
variety as sources of strength. 
These uncontroversial ideals give implementers guidance on how to 
prepare, install, and maintain a diversity plan. “Otherwise qualified,” a 
term borrowed from disability discrimination law, informs their task. For 
example, the tripartite scheme of American government recognizes the 
executive, legislature, and judiciary as units; a claimant that is not a unit 
holds no entitlement to participate in the powers of “separation of 
powers.” In a commercial market, sellers must have goods to sell and 
buyers must have money to buy. Pluralism also imposes conditions for 
membership. And so diversity measures, by analogy, necessarily 
determine which axes of variation deserve attention and which must be 
ignored. 
Civil rights categories are a plausible starting point for any diversity 
plan. Statutes declare that a short list of characteristics calls for attention 
from positive law. By omission legislatures have also determined that 
other characteristics warrant less concern. Implementers of a diversity plan 
who follow this design would ignore diversity of, say, eye color or height or 
hobbies on the ground that the variety in question would be trivial. At the 
other end of the importance spectrum, diversity of race and sex and ability 
(as an antonym of disability) warrant consideration, at least at the outset. 
Implementers would cite other possible categories in the middle, eligible 
for debate about whether diversity on the axis would rectify injustice, per 
the antisubordination justification, or, consistent with the variety-analogy 
justification, foster significant pluralism. 
 “Plurality, dialogue, and redundancy,” the three central virtues of 
what Robert Schapiro calls “polyphonic federalism,”277 emerge from 
social-setting diversity at least as well as from federalism in American 
government, which can engage as few as two participants: state power 
and federal power. When present in settings like schools and workplaces, 
 
 277. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental 
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diversity will exist on more than one axis. Polyphonic federalism 
describes a national system containing several dozen states, of course, 
and so what Schapiro has extolled in government will offer robust 
examples of all three values. Of them, this Article has spent the most 
time on plurality.278 As practiced by diverse participants in any 
ecosystem, the “dialogue” value notes mutual influence and the sharing 
of information.279 Redundancy, the third virtue, offers protection should a 
constituent of the mix happen to fail. 
Settings where courts have condoned the diversity rationale—
sometimes as a compelling governmental interest, sometimes an option 
acceptable under statutory law—illustrate plurality, dialogue, and 
redundancy as policy. When the Supreme Court approved the diversity 
rationale in Bakke and Grutter, it did so with reference to multiplicity 
and variety rather than the rectification of injustice. The problem of 
injustice persists, however, and not only because claims of historical 
wrongs call for repair. Whenever scarcity exists, any policy of favoring 
someone is necessarily also a policy of disfavoring someone else; though 
vaunted for its optimism and good cheer, diversity can hurt. 
Decisionmakers, especially when they are state actors, must apply the 
rationale with care. 
For these implementers of the diversity rationale, challenges will 
persist. Values extolled in American law and government—including 
“uniformity, finality, and hierarchical accountability”280—stand in 
contrast to diversity’s plurality, dialogue, and redundancy. As Peter 
Schuck has warned, “[t]he law systematically favors homogeneity over 
diversity.”281 Moreover, Schuck notes, “government and law are natural 
enemies of diversity, especially when they are most eager to create it.”282 
Unfamiliarity or divergence in a human population brings discomfort to 
individuals as well.283 The virtue of this dissonance as experienced by 
institutions, individuals, and state actors is that it alerts participants to 
gains—not only the enhancements of plurality and dialogue and 
redundancy—but also the repair of wrongs. 
 
 278. See supra Part IV.A. 
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 282. Id. at 323. 
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Proponents and opponents of diversity alike have been proceeding 
as if the diversity rationale were thin: at best an excuse, rather than a 
justification, for imposing detriment on human beings.284 Yet diversity 
may be justified. Although it imposes undeniable costs and although its 
application can be erroneous in particular contexts, diversity remains the 
only rationale for discrimination that can work toward rectification of 
historical injustice while honoring the “fundamental American 
principle”285 of e pluribus unum. It posits—and has demonstrated—that 
variety and difference generate strength. 
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